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THE FORTNIGHTLY

JANUARY, 1940



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THE END OF AN AGE?

BY THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, D.D.

SPENGLER'S *Downfall of the West* was the first of a long series of books on the same theme. The artificial schematism of Spengler's philosophy of history, with its theory of cycles of culture and civilization, did not win much acceptance from trained historians; its astonishing vogue in Germany was a symptom of the profound pessimism which crushed the German nation for fifteen years after the Great War. But the conviction or suspicion that we have reached a turning-point of civilization, such as marked the end of Graeco-Roman culture at the disruption of the western empire, is widespread in Europe generally. We have had books by Nicholas Berdyaeff, a Russian exile living in France; by Huizinga and Heering in Holland; by Drucker, an Austrian; by Lippmann, an American; by de Reynold, a Swiss; by Count Keyserling, a Baltic Baron; and by our own countrymen, F. A. Voigt, Bertrand Russell, H. G. Wells, Aldous Huxley and Christopher Dawson. I will try to summarize the views of some of these authors, and to give my own opinion on the present world-crisis.

It is obvious that the present war has greatly increased the probability of a *culbute générale*. The next two years may be decisive for the fate of Europe during the present century. What that fate will be it is impossible to say. We have been dragged into an ideological war against Hitlerian Nazism, an act, in my opinion, of ruinous and almost inconceivable folly. We might have learned from earlier experience in La Vendée and in Russia what is the result of supporting counter-revolutionary movements in other countries. In Germany there were millions of anti-Nazis, who in a few years would probably have rescued their country from a hateful tyranny. Now they all have to rally to the government, or to

be traitors. It will not be seriously argued that our attack upon Germany was a piece of knight-errantry on behalf of the Slavs of Eastern Europe, who are nothing to us. The Cabinet, which a year ago was pacific, seems to have been worried into war by the Socialists, who with incorrigible fatuity believed that Nazism is capitalistic, that Russia is unaggressive and democratic, and that Stalin, who has never concealed his hatred and contempt for popular government, would help France and England against Germany.

It is surely plain enough what our true policy would have been. We ought to have made it clear to the French that though our defensive alliance with them would of course be honoured if France were directly attacked, we had nothing to do with any pacts which they might have made with other countries, and that if they went to war in consequence of such pacts we should consider France the aggressor and stand aside. Hitler has again and again offered to come to terms with us on the basis of acknowledging our maritime supremacy, while we left him a free hand to recover what Versailles took from Germany and Austria in Eastern Europe. He made these offers sincerely, not that he has any objection to telling lies, but because no nation, and certainly not Germany, can afford to keep both the largest army and the largest navy. This understanding would have done no harm to France, for Hitler has entirely abandoned any idea of aggression against that country, and indeed would like to make an alliance with the French.

But it will be asked, can we allow Germany " to dominate the world by force " ? This is sheer nonsense. There is only one nation which might conceivably dominate half the world by force, and that nation is not Germany. In 1914 the Teutonic Empires wished to try conclusions with the Slavs. The French, eager to recover their lost provinces, entangled us in what became a world-war, the main result of which was to save Russia from irreparable disaster. This conflict will some day —not just yet—have to be decided ; the rivalry between Slav and Teuton has gone on for many centuries. Time is altogether on the side of the Slavs, who, as Bismarck said, multiply like rabbits, while the Germans multiply like hares. (The vital statistics are given in the introduction to my new book, *A*

Pacifist in Trouble). Some of us may live to wonder what possessed us to break down the sole barrier against the domination of Asia and the European continent by post-bolshevik Russia, which will be far more formidable than the empire of the incompetent Romanoffs.

The complete uncertainty of the future makes this article very difficult to write. But I think that most of the writers whom we are to consider have underestimated the force of habit and tradition, the intrinsic strength of the western industrial system, and the recuperative power which modern technology has given to civilized societies. Even now I believe that twenty years of peace would stabilize our institutions and bring to an end violent revolutions, the futility of which has been amply demonstrated. Even if Europe were submerged in a welter of barbarism the United States, which after this suicidal war will be the only great Naval power, will remain intact, and if the British Dominions beyond the seas are menaced, they will look to America for protection.

NICHOLAS BERDYAEFF has had the unusual experience of being punished both by the Czarist and the Bolshevik governments. As a theologian he has a European reputation. The intensity of his religious convictions makes his books very impressive, and they throw interesting side lights on the differences between piety in the Eastern Orthodox and in the Roman Catholic Church. As a publicist he has written *The End of our Time* (1933) and *The Fate of Man in the Modern World* (1935).

An unknown era, he says, is upon us. Something in the soul of modern man was shattered before his historical values were upset. We are witnessing the end of the Renaissance, and of the Humanism which was its spiritual basis. Our faith in man is shaken to its foundations. This is a time of spiritual decadence, of loneliness and dereliction. At the beginning of the Renaissance there was a flowering of brilliant genius. Such golden ages usually follow the fusion of two races or two cultures. In this case there was first a Christian Renaissance, in the thirteenth century, and then an efflorescence which we must not call pagan, but which owed its splendour to the recovery of the art and literature of classical antiquity. In so far as

there was a struggle between the natural and the spiritual man, the natural man won the victory.

The so-called Enlightenment was a pale reflection of the Renaissance, which was finally killed by the mechanization of modern civilization. The Renaissance began with a vigorous affirmation of man's creative individuality; it ended with a denial of it. Man is now depersonalized. Liberty, whether of action, speech, or thought, has been wholly destroyed over a great part of Europe. This is the beginning of barbarization. We have to look forward to a new dark age, like that which followed the fall of the Western Roman Empire.

It is quite certain, Berdyaeff thinks, that we cannot go back to the discarded ideas of the nineteenth century. Liberalism, democracy, socialism and communism are as much out of date as conservatism. They all belong to an age which has passed away for ever.

What then is the way to escape? The only hope for humanity, he says, is in a return to Christianity—the Christianity of the persecutions and the catacombs. Asceticism must once more be held in honour; the nations must return to a simpler mode of life. Berdyaeff casts a wistful eye on the Church-directed civilization of the middle ages.

Now nobody can dispute that if we were all as good Christians as a few men and women now are, this earth would be a delightful place to live in. But is there the slightest hope that 'the world' will ever be converted? The Founder of Christianity cherished no illusions of this kind; of all teachers He was the most discouraging. His followers, whom He called to a life of heroism and self-sacrifice, were to remain in permanent conflict with "the Prince of this world, who hath nothing in me". It is quite right to point out that Christ has offered to mankind a remedy for the miseries that beset us; but to suppose that 'the world' will soon listen to Him is a survival of nineteenth century optimism, the myth of a law of inevitable progress.

There is another deduction to be made from Berdyaeff's diagnosis and prognosis of the diseases from which Europe is suffering. Although he is fiercely opposed to Bolshevism, which he regards as Antichrist *in propria persona*, he has retained from his earlier allegiance to the revolution the habit of using

'bourgeois' and 'capitalism' as swear-words which excite him to fury, and make him rant like a Hyde Park orator. We must remember that until his exile he had never known the happiness of living in a free society, nor had he any first-hand knowledge of western civilization. Moreover, Russian thought is always destructive. Berdyaeff will sweep away liberalism, democracy, and especially socialism; but what would he put in their place?

A reasonable man may very well think that modern industrialism has produced all the fruits that it is capable of bearing, and that something analogous to a rotation of crops may bring to light new cultural values. Aristotle, as is well known, believed that all the arts develop until they reach their natural limit, and then "come to a stop". It is difficult, for example, to imagine any further progress on the lines of Greek art after the golden age. Modernist painters and sculptors have said the same of Renaissance art in Italy and Holland. They cannot do better, and they are not content to produce inferior copies; so they seek inspiration from the savages of Benin and geometrical patterns.

The same argument may be applied to politics. What is not respectable is to deny that the nineteenth century—the period between two Great Wars—was, except in the fine arts, the culminating point of civilization up to date. Historians will call it the wonderful century. In politics it was the epoch of the great Liberal experiment of peace, individual liberty, and popular government. In science it witnessed more progress than the whole of previous history taken together. In economics it enormously increased wealth and population. It brought into existence a great middle class, neither poor nor rich, who lived in tolerable comfort and were as well educated as their natural limitations permitted. It made the common man better off than he had ever been before, with higher wages and more opportunities for education and amusement than had ever fallen to his lot in earlier times. The amazing advances in technology were the result of strenuous competition, and could not have been reached in any other way. In literature it may bear comparison with the most famous periods. To pelt this wonderful age with scurrilous abuse stamps those who so behave as ignorant and prejudiced fanatics. Whatever changes in our

social order may be possible or desirable, to scorn and throw away the gains of the nineteenth century would be to plunge the world into barbarism. No other age is comparable with it for real progress. The age of the Antonines, in which Gibbon would have liked to live, was pleasant enough for well-to-do Roman citizens; it was not so agreeable for the slave or the provincial. It was also living on its intellectual capital. Except in law and religious philosophy, a Sahara of the higher intellect was already in view. Nor would any of us have liked to live in the middle ages. Whether we read a social history of the earlier medieval period, like Luchaire on the time of Philippe Auguste, or such a book as Huizinga's *Waning of the Middle Ages*, we find ourselves in a turbulent and violent age, emerging from barbarism and sunk in vice and crime.

The most interesting part of Berdyaeff's estimate of the present situation is his account of the forces which produced the Russian revolution. He has passed through communism and understands it; he loves Russia and believes in its future.

Revolutions are always infamous and always ineffectual, but they may be inevitable. They are a progressive decomposition of an old society and its culture. They are like an infectious epidemic; nothing can stop it from taking its course. Temperature will rise till the patient is delirious, and then it will fall below normal. Those who inaugurated the revolution or willed it always perish in it. In the Russian revolution the Bolsheviks were the realists, the constitutional democrats the dreamers. The victory of the latter would have been a negation of the traditions of the Russian people. Bolshevism was, in an inverted way, in accordance with Russian ideas; the Russians have never desired constitutional government. A counter-revolution can be effected only by after-revolutionary forces, developed in the womb of the revolution itself, which generates the anti-toxins which will ultimately destroy it. The French Revolution created Napoleon, who brought it to an end. The *émigrés* from France could do nothing, nor can the *émigrés* from Russia. The revolution has destroyed every kind of freedom in Russia; the counter-revolution must restore it. Russia was a vast shadowy land of peasants, an educated caste numerically very insignificant, and at the apex of society the unhappy Tsar,

whose fall dissolved society. The doctrinaire revolutionaries who made the revolution are dead, with Stalin's bullets in their skulls. Russia is now ruled by a new class of vigorous young men who graduated in the school of war, hard, grasping, and cruel. The same seems to be true of Germany and Italy. These are not really communists; they are the germ of a new *bourgeoisie*. "They are capable of turning communism into Fascism overnight." (They have already done so). There are already signs of a return to Christianity, "the religion of truth crucified."

The later book shows the same merits and the same defects, such as the amazing statement that "capitalism destroyed all national feeling in the working classes". It was one of the revelations of the Great War, and of the Nazi revolution, that when patriotism came into conflict with class-animosity, the latter went down almost without a struggle. The author is even more pessimistic than before. "A cycle of catastrophes and collapses has begun."

COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING was, like Berdyaeff, a Russian subject. He was one of the great landowners, of German extraction, in Esthonia. After losing his property and his country he lived in Germany, and for several years was head of a sort of Academy, the School of Wisdom, at Darmstadt. He has been a great traveller, and has published his reflections on the different cultures and national characters of Europe, Asia, North and South America, of which books the *Travel Diary of a Philosopher* is best known. *La Révolution Mondiale* was published in 1934.

He agrees with Berdyaeff that we have reached the end of an epoch. There has been a cataclysmal eruption of the lower, "telluric" forces of human nature, which has caused unparalleled horrors in Russia and other countries, but which has at the same time aroused a splendid vitality and joyous confidence in the young. This exaltation is to be noticed in Russia, Germany, Turkey and Italy. These young men reject with scorn all the values of the last century. Liberty, democracy, socialism are no longer words to conjure with. They fear neither death nor misery; they are ready to die and more than ready to

kill. Courage and faith are the only magnets that attract them.

Nevertheless, this apparent regression to savagery, this barbaric rejection of all that mankind has hitherto agreed to honour, may be the precursor of a new spirituality. The line of evolution which began in the eighteenth century had finished its course. It had no promise for the future. It ended in the dehumanization of man, in the reign of the machine, and in the vulgar worship of mere quantity.

Keyserling looks for a new Renaissance, rather pagan than Christian in character, since in his opinion Christian ethics separated spiritual values too sharply from " telluric ". He wants a new ascetic nobility, an idea which recalls H. G. Wells's " Samurai ", imagined in a past phase of his thought. But there may, he thinks, be a great Christian Renaissance, which will start in Russia.

Materialism and internationalism are both now discredited in Germany and Italy. The new nationalisms, first called into activity by Napoleon, have for the time destroyed internationalism. They have also put an end to class war, by establishing the integral unity of a people.

The notion that the dictatorships are anti-socialist is of course quite erroneous. On the contrary, nationalism is the most propitious form of State for socialization, since such measures will there meet with least resistance.

If Count Keyserling had lived in England or North America, or in one of the smaller countries belonging to the North Western European group, he would hardly have spoken of a ' world-revolution '. We have had no revolution, in the ordinary sense of the word, and do not seem likely to have one. Where are these hard, grasping, cruel young men whom he has seen in Russia, Germany and elsewhere ? The type is unknown in this country, where an attempt at social revolution in 1926 ended in football matches between general strikers and police. It is not only that in the group of countries mentioned, and in their colonies, the middle class is strong enough to resist ' liquidation ', but we have, properly speaking, no proletariat. The British workman is no proletarian ; he is a *petit bourgeois*. The theories of Marx have hardly touched him.

Events have already falsified his views of Russia and Germany. "The Hitlerian *régime* is non-imperialist." This could hardly be said now. The U.S.S.R. has swung back towards the pre-revolutionary Russia. There may be a remarkable religious revival there, but in other respects this semi-oriental nation can hardly be a pioneer to the West.

His new monastic order does not sound hopeful. History does not encourage the belief that monasticism can flourish without a definite religious basis, without a rule of celibacy, and without the protection of a powerful Church. Societies pledged to obey certain rules may of course do useful work.

The impression which Keyserling's book makes upon me is that he has exaggerated the gravity of the situation by concentrating his attention on certain continental countries, and paying no attention to the very important group who speak English, and their cousins in the North-West of the European Continent.

J. HUIZINGA, well known as a medievalist, published in 1936 an excellent little book called *In the Shadow of To-morrow*, with the sub-title, "A diagnosis of the spiritual distemper of our time". It is enlarged from an address delivered at Brussels in 1935. He takes from St. Bernard the motto, *Habet mundus iste noctes suas et non paucas*. In one of these 'nights' the world is groping its way.

We are in a demented world. Everywhere "men's hearts are failing them for fear, looking at the things that are coming on the earth". All that seemed sacred and immutable has become unsettled. There was a false dawn after the war, but darkness soon returned. There have been in history other periods of hope, soon to be disappointed. Such was the age of Erasmus, and of the French Revolution. Revolutionaries are buoyed up with the hope of sudden radical change; but we cannot speed up or retard the slow evolution of the historical process.

There is no close parallel in history to the systematic undermining of the social order which we see about us. Until now, the professed aim of reformers was always to restore something which they believed to have existed before. The doctrine of evolution has destroyed faith in revivals, and the modern type of *enragé* wishes simply to sever all ties with the

past. Every ideal which men have pursued for thousands of years is scorned and repudiated.

And yet the pulse of society still beats vigorously, and history knows of no great sudden changes. "It is quite possible that later periods will view our own simply as the aftermath of the Great War." Until the outbreak of hostilities last autumn I was inclined to take this view, and unless the present war is protracted to the ruin of the belligerents I still think Huizinga may be right. The steady progress of science, which is still healthy, should check despondency.

Still, the diagnosis is and must be disquieting. Huizinga gives great importance to the growth of a disintegrating relativism in philosophy and even in science. There is no longer anything absolutely true or false, right or wrong. Pragmatism allows us to believe whatever we wish to believe, and denies that truth has any other meaning than what suits us. So far has anti-intellectualism gone in discrediting rationalism, that "reason has to look to faith to save it from dissolution". Every puerile superstition, of which educated persons in the last century would have been ashamed, has taken heart of grace.

The repudiation of all ethical standards has encouraged the most shameless Machiavellianism in Germany; several instances are given. Huizinga points out very sensibly that there is no reason why the State should be the only super-moral organization. Not only may other States claim the same privileges, but groups within the State will place themselves above the moral law. The logical result of State-worship is absolute anarchism and Satanism.

Morality in practice is perhaps no worse; but the standard of ethics has deteriorated seriously. The romantic depreciation of virtue is a literary *genre*. In international ethics the collapse is complete. There has been a great increase in what he calls puerilism—turning play into work and work into play. Modernist art reveals the deep degradation of taste.

War is an anachronism and an abomination; no good can ever come of it. But the spirit of the peoples is corrupted and poisoned by hatred artificially stimulated. Like Keyserling, he appeals for a new asceticism, and a return to decent standards, which means a return to religion. He is not, I think, without

hope that, if we can keep the peace for a generation, Europe may regain her equilibrium.

Professor G. J. HEERING'S book, *The Fall of Christianity*, is an incisive indictment of the Churches for their failure to stop war. The present state of affairs is a deep stain upon our civilization, and the followers of Christ have not realized their responsibility.

More important for our present purpose is *The End of Economic Man* (1939) by PETER DRUCKER, an Austrian who after acting as financial editor of the *Frankfurter General Anzeiger*, joined an international banking house as economist, and was an adviser for British insurance companies. In 1937 he went to New York as correspondent for several British newspapers. He is therefore a highly competent economist and financier.

Fascism and Nazism represent a fundamental revolution. They are the only effective political force in Europe ; they have reduced democracy to impotent defence. Communism has definitely lost its fight. The West has wisely left it to cut its own throat in Russia, and it has done so.

It is not true that in Germany a majority hostile to Nazism is held down by terror, nor that Hitler's success is due to clever propaganda. Both in Italy and Germany all the means of propaganda were in anti-fascist hands until the victory of the two dictators. The phenomenon can be explained only by " a radical change in the order of values." The new order has no positive ideology, but is based on a negation of all the old ideas. Fascism is anti-everything. It is anti-liberal and anti-conservative ; anti-religious and anti-atheist ; anti-capitalist and anti-communist ; anti-war and anti-pacifist ; against big business and against the small tradesman. The author heard a Nazi agitator wildly applauded when he exclaimed, " We don't want lower bread prices, we don't want higher bread prices, we don't want unchanged bread prices ; we want National-Socialist bread prices." This, he says, came nearer to explaining Nazism than anything he has heard since.

He ventures on the paradox that the masses believe in Fascism because they do *not* believe in its promises. The masses were in despair. They recognized that Marxism is dead, and that socialism has become trade-unionism, a movement *within*

capitalism. But the great slump in 1929 shook men's belief in capitalism. Capitalism however has not failed as an economic system ; " it has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams ". But " there is no possibility of reconciling the supremacy of the economic sphere with the belief in freedom and equality as the true aims of society ". (Incidentally, he makes too much of " equality " all through the book. Of the windy French triad, we have chosen liberty, the French equality, the Americans fraternity. The Englishman cares little for equality.)

What we have to look for, according to Drucker, is the rejection of economics, and the search for a non-economic standard of values. The " Nazi miracle " is the introduction of a non-economic industrial socialism. This change in the standard of values all over Europe owes much more to the Churches than is usually admitted. Both Catholics and Protestants have worked for " the integration of the structure of industrial society into a non-mechanical order ".

As an expert economist he has much to say on Nazi economics. Nazism rejects absolutely the American creed of " consumptionism ", and returns to the economics of John Stuart Mill, who believed in thrift and saving. Both in Germany and Russia expenditure is drastically controlled, and a huge surplus is created, which is compulsorily invested in government loans. In Germany these loans are devoted to non-productive expenditure on armaments, which, it would seem, must lead at last to a crash ; but, as Drucker says, expenditure on guns is not more unproductive than on champagne, cigars and cosmetics.

Are the totalitarian States unlike the rest of Europe ? National character is the last resort of baffled historians. Why then did democracy collapse in Italy and Germany ? Italy did *not* " lose the peace ", and for some years it looked as if Germany might assume the lead in a democratic movement against imperialism. But in both countries the *bourgeoisie* had no social prestige, and in both countries the great experience of the nineteenth century was not middle-class ascendancy but national unification. The Holy Roman Church and the Holy Roman Empire had prevented national unity in Italy and

Germany. Mussolini early realized the significance of the victory of Cavour over Garibaldi and Mazzini.

Totalitarian militarism serves the vital social purpose of supplying a non-economic basis of society while leaving unchanged the façade of industrial society. The end is not purely military. To make everybody at all times a soldier is to introduce real equality, or at least a career open to the talents. This policy was not in accordance with the views of the German army chiefs, who regard a conscript army as a serious military drawback. The merits of the policy are that it abolishes economic privilege, and substitutes the honour-code of an army for private profit motives. The appeal is to heroic self-sacrifice, one of the oldest ritual concepts of mankind. It has captured a large part of the post-war youth in all the totalitarian countries. It is the best, not the worst, of the young men who have been so attracted.

But though this kind of sacrifice offers an ideal for the individual, it makes society irrational and senseless, and the majority in those countries know it. "In spite of all propaganda, the masses in the totalitarian countries fear war even more than those in the democracies." The spontaneous and general rejoicing of the German and Italian people after the Munich accord was enough to prove this. The people are therefore being bled white for objects which are repugnant to them.

The governments attempt in vain to escape from this *impasse* by the persecution or defamation of personified demons, such as the Jews, the communists, and Winston Churchill. The attempt to find a persuasive non-economic motive has after all failed.

Organization has become an end in itself. A vast bureaucracy drains the revenue and strangles the vitality of the nation. An all-pervasive tyranny recalls the caste-system which wrecked the urban civilization of antiquity. But the masses have no alternative. They must live on parrot-cries which do not persuade them, for they have nothing better to say or do. Every fascist crowd is gripped by hysteria. The totalitarian war against liberty and religion is a proof of weakness, not strength ; it has its roots in black despair.

Nothing has done more harm than the insane notion of the Left Wing in the West that a united front between the democracies and "democratic Russia" was possible. "There must eventually be an alliance of Russia and Germany against the West. It is a nightmare to-day; it may be a reality to-morrow." "The continued existence of the democracies is the gravest danger to the stability of the totalitarian *régime*." "The two Powers may arrive at an agreement by partitioning Poland."

Drucker has proved to be right; I at least was not at all surprised. But eventually, as I have said, the conflict between Teuton and Slav must be decided, and Time is on the side of the Slav.

"The next decade will decide whether Europe can find the forces which will lead her out of the *impasse* into which the collapse of Economic Man has led her, or whether she has to grope her way through the darkness of totalitarian Fascism before she finds a new, positive, non-economic concept of Free Man."

(*To be concluded*)

THE GERMAN NAVY'S STRATEGY

By Herbert Rosinski

TO a superficial observer the war at sea might appear almost like a repetition of the last war. Once again he will find the Grand Fleet lying apparently purposeless in its northern harbours at Scapa Flow and elsewhere. Once again the work of the British control, proceeding in its shadow, is slowly but inexorably choking German oversea communications in its deadly stranglehold. Once again German counteraction, unable to break that deadly vice in open battle, has had to take the form of a roundabout attack by submarine, mine, aerial and surface raiders direct against the British lines of communication.

Yet beneath that deceiving superficial similarity the eye of the naval expert will immediately discover profound differences. One of these differences has already been pointed out by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond in his penetrating fundamental analysis of the naval side of the war in the October issue of this review : the fact that the German Navy to-day has no battle fleet corresponding to the powerful High Sea Fleet she possessed in 1914. The other is less easily perceptible and unknown even to most naval experts, yet in the long run probably no less significant and no less important. It is the fundamentally different outlook with which the German Navy has entered upon and so far conducted the present struggle : the change from a strategy aiming on traditional lines at " command of the sea " to a strategy of concentrated "trade warfare" directed against the British oversea lines of communication.

This second difference is not simply the result of the former. The German Navy has not turned to trade warfare merely because of the lack of a substantial battle fleet. Even with the same relative battle fleet strength as in 1914 the German Navy would to-day conduct her war against British Sea Power on

fundamentally different lines to those she pursued during the World War. For since its conclusion her ideas on naval warfare and naval strategy have undergone a profound and fundamental revolution, as the result of the breakdown of her original strategic conceptions during that conflict. It is by understanding that revolution in her strategic ideas that it is possible to understand the "inner motives", the hopes and the assumptions, upon which she is basing her present campaign.

The German Navy had entered the World War with a conception of Naval Strategy modelled more upon the familiar features of land warfare than the characteristics of the war at sea, of which she had so far had no large scale experience. Despite all lip service paid to a vague notion of "command of the sea" German naval thought at that time saw in naval warfare essentially a military duel between the two opposing fleets. To make ready the German Fleet for such a decisive struggle in a great pitched battle had been the central idea of Great Admiral von Tirpitz and his band of devoted collaborators for nearly two decades. Behind the obsession of that belief everything else had receded into a dim background. That such a battle would take place within a few weeks of the outbreak of the war nobody entertained the slightest doubts. With its "brutal superiority" the Grand Fleet would sally forth into the Heligoland Bight to impose the traditional close-range blockade upon the German North Sea ports. Then would be the favourable hour for the German Navy to force the issue near her own bases, where the mass attacks of her destroyer flotillas brought to a remarkably high pitch of efficiency, could be utilized to the utmost advantage. Under such favourable conditions, on her own ground, it was thought not inconceivable that she might be able to get the better of the Grand Fleet despite the latter's marked numerical superiority.

When, therefore, in the autumn of 1914 one week after the other passed without the Grand Fleet appearing to fulfil this preconceived picture, the plans of the German Admiral Staff collapsed over night like a house of cards. Too late the German Navy realized that the exceptionally favourable position of the British Isles athwart the western outlets of the North Sea enabled the Grand Fleet to reverse the rôles of attack and

defence and to enjoy all the advantages of the "command of the sea" from her far away base at Scapa Flow, without having first to acquire it by close range blockade and pitched battle close to the enemy's ports. Trained for a battle within a radius of a hundred miles around Heligoland, the German Navy thus found herself before the truly perplexing situation that the enemy, instead of coming forth to offer itself to a counterstroke, was able to sever all German sea borne communications—with the exception of those running through the Baltic—without the Navy being able to strike one single blow in their defence. Pent up in the innermost corner of the North Sea, the German Navy found herself as unable to shake off the stranglehold, which slowly choked the life out of her country, as to attack in her turn the vital communications of the Allies. The result was in the words of a German post-war naval critic a strategic "vacuum" in which the German Naval Command continued to keep its gaze hypnotically fixed upon the Grand Fleet, trying, in vain, by highly hazardous and strategically purposeless raids against the British East Coast to lure her into the hasty exposure of part of her forces. First the German oversea cruisers and later the German submarine campaign broke down in their attack against the weakly protected British lines of communication behind the shield of the Grand Fleet, because of the lack of adequate co-operation on the part of their own main forces.

This tragic picture of the powerful High Sea Fleet, built and trained at such tremendous cost and effort, lying for a great part of the war useless in its North Sea ports until the day when it had to sally forth to the ultimate surrender at Scapa Flow, was the dominant impression which the German Navy took away from the War. The memory of it continued to pursue the minds of those who had devoted their life to the upbuilding of that force. In vain did the official interpretation attempt to lay the fault for this helpless inactivity at the door of the various naval commanders-in-chief and of the fettering influences of the Imperial G.H.Q. In 1926 a Vice-Admiral on the retired list, Wolfgang Wegener, formulated his opposition to the official version in a small memorandum *The Naval Strategy of the World War.*

In this study Wegener for the first time pointed out that the

strategy of the German Navy before and during the World War had been suffering from a fundamental misdirection of her efforts. Obsessed by the conception of war as a naval duel the German Navy had utterly failed to realize that battles were not ends in themselves, but merely the means towards the real end of naval warfare : the control of the vital sea communications. That end, however, the German Navy from her hopeless geographical position in the North Sea was obviously incapable of achieving ; in the North Sea the battle she had been seeking with such ardour would have been strategically without effect, even if it had ended in her victory. To break that spell, wage real naval warfare and effectively threaten the superior British position at Scapa Flow, something more was needed than strategically purposeless raids against the East Coast : a strategic offensive carrying the German Fleet through the Danish Sounds to a position at Skagen, commanding the Nordic trade route running though the Skagerrak and, from there, to the S.W. Coast of Norway and, finally, if necessary, across the North Sea to the Shetland Islands. In that way lay not only the certainty of a truly decisive battle, but also hope of breaking open the doorway to the Atlantic.

Admiral Wegener's study created the most profound impression in German naval circles. Its frank criticism of German naval thought both before and during the War might be resented. Its positive proposals could be easily demonstrated to disregard all the realities of the situation. Yet all this could not seriously detract from the fact that its author had for the first time laid his finger upon the fundamental weakness of the German Navy's strategy and for the first time had directed her eyes upon the real aim and objective of naval warfare.

Yet Wegener's discovery, that the real task of a navy lay not in seeking sterile victories, but in assuring the maintenance of its country's vital sea communications, was but the first step towards the development of a new German naval doctrine. At first sight, in the then state of the German Navy, it might have seemed merely destined to bring home to the Germans the hopeless position to which she had been reduced at Versailles. If the tiny force left to Germany could no longer hope to hold its own even against a second rate Sea Power, how much less

was it capable of assuring the German transatlantic communications, which the mighty High Sea Fleet had failed to maintain in 1914. The manner in which this apparently hopeless proposition was solved, or rather circumvented, when ten years years later the resurrection of German sea power under the Third Reich imperatively demanded a fundamental strategic idea, was highly ingenious. The New School of German naval strategy, which arose rather abruptly sometime around 1936, and rapidly permeated the whole service with its ideas, based its picture of the *rôle* of the German Navy upon two main tenets. The first of these was that, according to the express statement of the *Führer* and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of June 1935, a conflict with the British Fleet was henceforth utterly out of the question and need no longer be taken into any consideration. That contingency eliminated, the task of the German navy would be to assure Germany's transatlantic communications against "other continental powers", by which designation German naval writers clearly understood a Franco-Russian coalition. That aim the German Navy was believed fully capable of fulfilling, in view of the fact that war at sea was no longer directed upon the outdated notion of acquiring a general or "absolute" command of the sea. Instead, the new school claimed, belligerent parties would in future confine their efforts to the direct defence of their own and the attack of the convoys, without first attempting to brush their opponent off the sea altogether. Great pitched battles would no longer take place and such smaller or greater clashes, as might occur, would arise out of the accidents of trade warfare, not however to be sought for the establishment of a general supremacy.

It needs but a glance at the map to understand how such a state of mutual trade warfare, as envisaged by these German naval strategists, would have fitted exactly the case of the German Navy in such a struggle against a Franco-Russian combination. In that case a neutral Great Britain would actually have interposed like an impenetrable screen between the German and French areas of local predominance. From her very unfavourable position, in the extreme S.W. corner of the North Sea, the French Navy would have been powerless effectively to attack German convoys crossing the North Sea.

The effect would have been, as a recent German pamphlet described it " as if the estuaries of Elbe and Weser were for all strategical purposes projected to a line running from Scotland to the S.W. coast of Norway ". Once that line was reached, merchantmen could be dismissed into the immense space of the open Atlantic with its unlimited possibilities for evasive routeing, while the French on their side would have been able to maintain their predominance in the Bay of Biscay. Thus in this particular case, as the leading French naval expert Admiral Castex agreed, the German Navy would indeed have found itself able to fulfil the fundamental task of maintaining its vital Atlantic communications, without having first to wrest a general command of the sea from its opponent.

The full significance of this fundamental change in the German Navy's outlook from its original concentration upon the enemy's battle fleet to cruiser warfare against his communications revealed itself, however, only in the third phase, when from the autumn of 1938 onwards the German Navy's thoughts—despite platonic protestations to the contrary—began to turn more and more towards the problem—so lightly dismissed as out of question—of a naval struggle against Great Britain. On the *defensive* side, indeed, the specious pleading contained in the New School's doctrine that the days of " absolute " command were past promptly revealed itself. By no stretch of imagination was it conceivable that Great Britain would be satisfied with utilizing the overwhelming numerical superiority at her disposal merely for the convoying of her merchantmen and cruiser warfare against German convoys, instead of establishing with it an " absolute " command even more firm and unchallengeable than the one maintained by her during the World War. Before the overwhelming superiority of British Sea Power the whole edifice of expedients by which the German Navy had claimed to be able to fulfil its fundamental defensive functions hopelessly collapsed and was silently dropped overboard. One well known Admiral naïvely remarked that a conflict with Great Britain " would confront German Naval Strategy in the North Sea with some very difficult tasks ". On the *offensive* side, however, the turning of German naval strategy towards " cruiser warfare " fitted her needs in a struggle

with this country as perfectly as its defensive aspect had fitted the case of a struggle with France alone.

For the German Navy, in her present pronounced inferiority in battleship strength, to dream of challenging the Grand Fleet's overwhelming superiority would have been not only hopeless, but nothing short of madness. Even to attempt her old game in the World War and try to cut off individual ships and sections of the British main forces in the North Sea would have meant, at the best, a fatal dissipation of effort and the repetition of her former error of making the enemy's armed forces and not his communications the object of her actions. By concentrating, on the other hand, all her forces—relieved from protective duties except in the Baltic—upon the one aim of direct attack by cruiser warfare—submarine, aerial and surface—upon the British convoys behind the shield of the Grand Fleet she would attack her opponent's weakness instead of its strength and might hope to inflict at least severe, possibly even decisive damage. For such an attack she could muster strong forces. Her submarine fleet of some 70 units built or nearing completion, represented a force such as she had not been able to achieve in the World War until 1916, after two years of conflict. Thus, in contrast her submarine attack would not be intensified gradually, parallel to the strengthening of the defence, but would be able to start in full force at the very outset of the campaign at a moment when the chief measure for the defence, the grouping of merchantmen into convoys, had only just been able to start and would not be completed for many weeks to come.

Above all, however, the submarine campaign would this time not be conducted as an isolated action by itself, as during the World War, but in strict co-ordination with all other weapons at the disposal of the German Navy. In the North Sea it would be supplemented by the as yet untried weapon of aerial attack against convoys of which naval experts in all countries had formed great expectations. In the Atlantic submarine warfare and cruiser warfare by powerful surface raiders would be able to act in closest co-operation. During the World War the German Navy had let her submarines be beaten by the weak convoy escorts of destroyers and armed auxiliaries, because she had never attempted to send out cruisers through the

British lines of blockade and roll up the convoys behind it. Now the submarine was to force the isolated merchantmen into convoys, thus providing huge targets for the surface raider to swoop down upon and overwhelm. In the three—now two—pocket-battleships, originally constructed for cruiser warfare against the French communications in the Bay of Biscay, the German Navy possessed the ideal vessels for the application of that strategy. With their heavy armament of six 11 inch guns and fairly strong armour, they were able to overpower without difficulty any escort vessel short of a battleship or battle cruiser, while their speed of 26 knots enabled them to evade all battleships with the exception of the three British battle cruisers "Hood," "Renown" and "Repulse" and the two French battleships, "Dunkerque" and "Strasbourg." Against them, or even against the five weaker 10,000 ton cruisers with 8 inch guns built or building for the German Navy, the weak escort vessels built or projected in this country would stand no chance whatsoever, as Admiral Meurer triumphantly pointed out with remarkable frankness in the article already quoted by Admiral Richmond. How serious in fact that threat was considered to be can be seen from Mr. Winston Churchill's speech in the House of Commons in which he successfully pleaded for the retention of the five old battleships of the Royal Sovereign class as a stiffening for important convoys.

Since then the German Navy has had the opportunity of testing its strategic doctrines in practice. If they have enabled it to avoid the flagrant errors of the World War the results of the first four months of the war have so far failed to bear out the great expectations based upon the New Strategy. The submarine menace, after initial successes, which, however, never approached anything like the sinkings at the height of the unrestricted submarine campaign in the spring and summer of 1917 have been safely kept under control. The mine, in the World War only a subordinate branch of submarine warfare proper, has begun to decline from the dramatic prominence into which it had sprung for a moment. Aerial attacks against men-of-war as well as convoys have so far proved wholly unsuccessful. Most surprising of all, however, co-operation between surface raiders and submarines has proved a complete failure. All that the much

vaunted pocket-battleships have been able to achieve has been the capture of a few isolated merchantmen, far less than the weak German oversea cruisers of 1914 ; while they have completely failed to bring off that wholesale attack and destruction of convoys, which naval experts in both camps feared—or hoped for.

One fundamental reason for the upsetting of the German Navy's calculations, despite their incomparably clearer grasp of the principles of naval strategy compared with the World War, can be pointed out. It is the understandable, but nevertheless fatally erroneous neglect of the fundamental *rôle* of Great Britain's command of the sea. In the World War it was the " Command " established by the Grand Fleet from Scapa Flow that formed the pivot that supported everything else : the control of the High Sea Fleet within the North Sea, the deadly blockade and the whole system of commerce protection by convoys that beat the submarine. The German Navy failed to break it and probably would have failed to do so, even if she had understood it better. In the years after the War the German Navy, despairing of ever being able again to wrestle for the " command ", tried to console itself by the special plea that the " absolute " command was neither necessary, nor up-to-date. To-day the German propaganda does not cease to proclaim that the German Navy *has* wrested the " command " from the British Navy in the North Sea and in the open Atlantic. Yet all these claims and all these fulminations are unable to alter or even to disguise the fundamental fact that that command exists, firmer than at any other time, and that upon this rock all the German Navy's plans for a super commerce warfare must gradually, but inexorably shatter themselves.

THE TWILIGHT OF NEUTRALITY

By W. Friedmann

THE present war is essentially the climax of a continuous and steadily intensifying international social crisis, which broke out twenty-five years ago, and in the process of which many established values, political, cultural, social, economic, legal, have been shattered. Not the least significant of the issues in the present war is the onslaught upon the conception and law of neutrality, as it had crystallized during the 19th century. Neutrality was badly shaken by the war of 1914 to 1918 but just managed to survive. The League of Nations and its principles of collective security purported to abolish neutrality in principle. With the collapse of the League many thought that Neutrality had risen like the Phœnix from the ashes, but in fact, as the present war shows in full clarity, political and social conditions had so much changed that Neutrality, as we know it, cannot survive.

First, what were the essential features of Neutrality, as it is at present desperately, and perhaps hopelessly defended by countries like Holland, Belgium and the Scandinavias? The law of neutrality is mainly customary, but much of it has been crystallized in the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the Hague Conventions which are still theoretically binding between the parties, *i.e.*, the great majority of states, and in the Declaration of London of 1909, which purported to codify the law of maritime warfare, but was not ratified and to-day may well be described as the tombstone of an epoch.

Neutrality, as it stood in 1914, was essentially a passive attitude taken towards the belligerents by all other states. These states, within the sphere of governmental activity and responsibility, were charged with impartiality towards the belligerents and with abstention from interference in the war. Thus no transport of belligerent contingents through neutral

territory was permissible, no enlistment campaign for either belligerent could be permitted, and no neutral bases could be used by either of the belligerents.

The most essential feature of that conception of neutrality, which is now so decisively challenged, was that neutral duties did not extend to neutral trade. The tacit assumption was that trade was universally private. Neutral merchants were free to trade with either belligerent, at their own risk, and subject to certain restrictions which, through centuries of adjustment and a continuous tug-of-war between neutrals and belligerents had become well established: belligerents had the right to search neutral ships for contraband, *i.e.*, articles designed to further the conduct of the war or to blockade certain parts of the enemy coast. But, in principle, neutral trade was free, even enemy goods borne in neutral ships. The result was that it was possible for neutral trade to flourish in time of war, while neutral governments could show complete detachment. Where military and geographical conditions were roughly equally favourable to both sides, belligerents would, on the whole, not interfere too much. Where that was not the case, as in the respective position of the Allies and the Central Powers towards the United States in the last war, the handicapped belligerent would be likely to interfere. The potentiality of bigger neutral responsibilities arose from the fact that no government is indifferent to the commercial prosperity of the whole or part of its citizens and would therefore act to protect their freedom of trade.

The last war produced many cracks in this structure, especially through the extension of contraband in modern warfare. Both sides went on extending their lists of contraband, until they included practically every article of any importance which might, directly or indirectly, reach the enemy. Moreover, Germany, less favourably placed in her overseas commerce than the Allies, soon resorted to illegal attacks upon neutral trade. After the United States had joined the war, it was left to a few smaller neutral countries, notably Holland and the Scandinavian states, to maintain the rights of neutral trade and a certain balance in their commercial relations with both sides.

The conclusion of the war, and the first post-war era brought

an attack upon neutrality of a quite different character. The League of Nations Covenant revived the medieval idea of just and unjust wars and excluded, for members of the League, neutrality in all those wars which the League Covenant outlawed. In a war of aggression by any state against a member of the League it was the duty of every member immediately and automatically to break off economic relations with the aggressor. This League principle, even while the League had some measure of authority, remained an ideology rather than a principle of action. The lack of universality of the League, numerous international treaties expressly stipulating neutrality between parties of which at least one was a League member, resolutions and declarations restricting the obligations to apply economic, let alone military sanctions automatically, and leaving their application ultimately to the discretion of every member, these and other factors kept neutrality alive under the League. As a distinguished international lawyer has put it :

> Neutrality and collective security are complementary concepts ; the more there is of the one, the less there is of the other.*

When the League collapsed as an effective factor in international relations, many thought that the old rules of neutrality could simply resume their former position. Others realized the change in international political and social conditions and the difficulty of each neutral defending its status singly ; they therefore put forward schemes of collective neutrality, implying collective neutral action to protect the status of neutrality. It is obvious that such schemes raise even greater problems than the principle of collective action evolved by the League. In both cases there is the danger of being involved in war, but both on psychological and ethical grounds there is a stronger inducement to do so for a principle of international order like the League principle, than for the essentially negative principle of neutrality.

The collapse of the League left a world that had travelled a long way from the social economic and political conditions which had produced the rules of neutrality as laid down in the Hague Conventions and the Declaration of Paris. But law, largely owing to the traditional conservatism of its professional

*Professor Lauterparht (1936) Politica 133 et seq.

interpreters, often persists long after the conditions which produced it have vanished. Hence to-day all belligerents still profess to be bound by a law of neutrality which is largely inapplicable.

The principal factors which make a restoration of the old law of neutrality impossible, because they have created a quite incompatible political and social international situation, seem to me to be the following :

1. The increase of state control over the formerly private sphere of trade and commerce, as a permanent, not merely a war time feature.

2. The predominantly economic character of modern totalitarian warfare, which makes it imperative to strangle the entire economic life of the enemy and thus to cut him off from all international trade as far as is in the power of the opponent.

3. As a counterpart to factors 1 and 2 the formation of a new economic conception, incompatible with the principle of general international trade, upon which the law of neutrality is based. This conception envisages closed economic blocs, most of them dominated by one powerful state.

4. The ideological, crusading and aggressive character of present day war, the climax of a deep conflict of political and social systems, each of which must and does tend to incorporate the neutral not only economically, but also politically, so that no neutral can be indifferent " in thought " although various motives may induce him to remain impartial in action.

5. As a result of these factors the present war is characterized by the threat to the independence of small nations, who are traditionally the mainstay of neutrality.

The emergence of the State as the direct or indirect controller of economic life affects the basic assumptions of the customary rules of neutrality to such an extent that it is remarkable that so little notice there has been taken of it. That international trade was private, was so much taken for granted before 1914 that neither the Hague Conventions nor the Declaration of London even mention the fact; yet it is vital to the operation of the cardinal rule that the duty of abstention from interference with the war and of impartiality towards the belligerents is confined to the government of neutral countries, while neutral trade with either or both of the belligerent parties may be continued in whatever way business motives, geographical considerations or sympathies may determine, and subject only to the restrictions which, as mentioned above, may be imposed by the belligerents. But what happens to this rule, when the government owns or controls merchant shipping, as in Soviet Russia, or the United States (formerly) or controls the international trade of the

country by means of export and import control, planning of production, allocation of raw materials and shipping space, by a rigid system of currency control? The latter form of state control applied, even in peace time, to Germany, Italy, Japan, and as far as trade in war materials was concerned, to Great Britain and, through the nationalization of the arms industry, to France. In Soviet Russia all trade is state trade. As the Spanish Civil war has shown in particular, international trade thereby ceases to be a purely commercial matter and assumes political significance. Trade becomes a part of state policy. The problem was brought out by the recent Soviet note to the Allies protesting against the blockade. *Inter alia*, it stressed the fact that all Soviet merchant ships are state owned and should, therefore, not be subject to interference. If this argument were adopted, it would give Soviet Russia a privileged position among all neutral nations.

In modern wars state control is reinforced, in order to co-ordinate the national machinery for war purposes and pursue the war more effectively. The last war went far in the direction of totalitarian government, on all sides. Although the allied Powers attempted, as far as possible, to return to pre-war conditions, when the war was finished, the growing complexity and urgency of social problems, and later on, the danger of war did not allow it. State interference, in trade and industry, whether planned or unplanned, whether through direct state industry and commerce or through tariffs, subsidies, currency regulations, etc., speedily increased, whereas all totalitarian states made state control a matter of principle. The outbreak of the present war therefore found all nations much better prepared, although not in equal measure, to assume full control of economic life for the cardinal purpose of conquering the enemy economically. It started where the last war ended, with unrestricted submarine and mine warfare by Germany, and a complete blockade of Germany's seaborne trade by the Allies, through a list of contraband covering practically everything, and the cutting off of all trade with Germany. For countries exposed to the full pressure from both sides, such as Holland, Belgium or the Scandinavian states the combined effect of these

measures is very grave, especially as Germany at least backs her own measures by military pressure on these neutrals.

The Law of Neutrality as it has developed during the last few centuries, is largely the result and expression of a balance of power in Europe, a code of behaviour developed by big nations which found it, on the whole, preferable to respect neutrality because the disadvantages of not doing so would have outweighed the advantages. When the balance of power was destroyed, as in the Napoleonic era, neutrality went by the board. When the balance of power was restored, neutrality reappeared. Economic conditions, geographical position, military strength may make it worth while for both sides to respect neutrality rather than destroy a source of supply for the enemy. But of the smaller European neutral countries, whose economic existence is bound up with respect for the traditional rules of neutrality, it appears that Denmark is at present the only one in this highly precarious position. In view of her close economic relations with Great Britain, especially her large supplies of vital foodstuffs to this country, and of her military helplessness towards Germany, it would seem the natural course for Germany to force Denmark into abandoning her commerce with Britain. This was attempted, but apparently soon given up, and the reasons are not difficult to find. Denmark's agricultural capacity depends largely on concentrated animal feeding stuffs imported from overseas and subject to the allied blockade. Reprisals by Britain would ruin Danish agriculture and thus destroy an important source of food supplies for Germany as well as make an important customer of German goods insolvent. Thus, for the time being, a precarious balance is maintained. This balance, however, hardly exists in regard to say Sweden or Holland. For Germany the exclusive control of Swedish iron ore and timber, to the detriment of Great Britain, may outweigh the disadvantages of violating her neutrality. In the case of Holland, it is her special position as a transit country for German goods, and her vital strategic position in a war with Britain which upsets the balance.

On the whole, then, the totalitarian character of modern warfare and the pre-eminence of the economic weapon makes that balance of power which supported the law of neutrality, a

rare exception, and the wish to violate neutrality, in order to hit the enemy's economic life, the rule.

The economic war policy just described has a positive counterpart : the substitution of coherent, closed and self sufficient economic blocs for the general and undiscriminating international trade of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Despite cross currents, the tendency is unmistakable. Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, all pursue, in different ways and with different emphasis, the creation of powerful blocs under their leadership, blocs which would be cemented by economic as well as by political ties. Similar tendencies are more vaguely discernible on the American Continent. Smaller countries, like Belgium and Holland, the Scandinavias, the Balkans, are included in these schemes, mainly as suppliers of raw materials or agricultural produce, in exchange for industrial products. Others, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, have already been brought in.

There is no room, in any of these plans and campaigns, for the impartial detachment which is the essence of neutrality, This new conception of closed economic empires is fostered by the relentless economic struggle of the present war. If Germany wants to prevent Holland or Sweden from trading with the enemy, or perhaps with anyone but herself, she must find a substitute for these vital sources of livelihood. Since she cannot pay cash for goods in foreign currency, she would force them into her own economic system by a mixture of military threats, barter trade and I.O.U.'s. If, on the other hand, Britain's measures are to succeed, if Holland is to be deprived of her vital transit trade with Germany, she will have to be found substitute markets, or fall an easier prey to German aspirations.

These economic tendencies are strongly reinforced by a non-economic factor : the crusading and missionary character of the new totalitarian imperialism. The Russian penetration of the Baltic, Balkans or Asia may be in the name of the liberation of the working people, the German drive towards the Low Countries or Scandinavia in the name of the colonizing mission of the Germanic master race, and both may, in fact, be animated by the same lust of power of a few men, but there is no doubt that both wish to spread, with political and economic domination, their social and political creed. No country, once in the German

or Russian Lebensraum, will be able to continue a way of political life different from that of the conqueror. And although on the other side the battle cry is Freedom and the independence of nations, it follows that round this battle cry will rally all those who believe in the values implicit in such a battle cry, especially when held against the creed of the other side. If the United States acknowledge that there can be no moral neutrality in the present war, this is certainly true of all European nations which are, actively or passively, in the battle zone. This is more and more strongly realized by many of the countries which have hitherto been only too anxious to avoid commitments and to maintain an attitude of absolute, if apprehensive impartiality. Hitherto blocs like the Scandinavian bloc have not gone beyond emphasis on common values and interests. They have carefully abstained from military understanding and now may find themselves overpowered singly, one after the other.

So far the discussion has mainly centred round the traditionally neutral smaller nations. They, indeed, are being forced to adhere to some powerful bloc, whether aggressive or defensive. There are, on the other hand, a number of powerful nations which seem quite well able to remain neutral and to enforce respect for certain elementary neutral rights. As for these great nations, it is well to distinguish between the neutrality of Italy and Japan on one hand, and the United States on the other. (As for Russia, her neutrality in the struggle between the Allies and Germany was never more than the abstention from direct military action.)

The neutrality of Italy and Japan has nothing of the passive attitude of abstention and impartiality which is the traditional conception of neutrality. Of the smaller nations it can be said that neutrality in wars between big powers is vital to them, part as it were of the air they must breathe to live. But for Italy and Japan neutrality—for the time being—is an intensely active policy of imperialistic nations. They see for the present, and for obvious reasons, the greatest advantage in an attitude of watchful balance, while "keeping their powder dry". The eclipse of Neutrality does not mean that all nations must be at war; it does mean that the particular combination of political

abstention and impartiality with private commercial activity, essential to the smaller nations, has disappeared.

The one Great Power which has had an essential part in the geographical position on one hand, and her enormous importance as a reservoir of supplies to belligerents in other Continents, is the United States. And it is significant that this very country should have voluntarily abandoned for herself the status which she was instrumental in consolidating throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. The neutrality legislation of 1937 to 1939 signifies that the particular combination of political abstention and profitable trade is no longer considered as practicable. But the alternative solutions are hitherto tentative. What is clear is that there are in the United States, two conflicting tendencies : either to withdraw from European affairs, develop an American sphere of interest and, perhaps, an American civilization, in conjunction with the other American states, which is ultimately possible only by an abandonment of many trade and other interests in Europe, and, perhaps, also in Asia ; or to maintain an economic, political and ideological interest in Europe, which means ultimately an active interest in the European struggle. Even in the last war the United States could not maintain both her neutrality and her European commitments and interests. How much less likely is it in the present war, in which the economic warfare started where it stopped in the last war. The United States has not yet finally chosen between these alternatives. The Neutrality Act of 1937, by its compulsory embargo on all war materials, and its discretionary embargo on other materials, unless transferred before transport to the purchaser and carried in other than American ships, strongly points in the direction of withdrawal. This tendency is strengthened by the 1939 Act, in so far as it introduces the cash and carry clause and bans American shipping from the war zone—an unprecedented step taken by one of the greatest maritime powers able to protect its merchant fleets against illegal interference. The positive counterpart of that policy is represented by the growing activity of the Pan-American Conference, and, quite recently, by the Panama Declaration of Neutrality, which creates a protective ring round the American Continent. But

is weakened by the cancellation of the embargo on war materials, coupled with the cash and carry clause, which, in effect, enables the Allies alone to make purchases and thus invites the wrath of Germany. It is a compromise solution. Since then, the Russian invasion of Finland has produced a reaction in America which may well make the pendulum swing far in the other direction. Be that as it may, eventually the one or the other alternative must prevail. The present compromise is not likely to be permanent.

Neutrality, as we know it, has been the result of a certain political condition of Europe, in existence throughout the greater part of the last few centuries, when a certain number of powerful states kept each other in check, a system for which the existence of neutral countries was essential. While subject to perpetual fluctuations, it attained sufficient stability to allow the growth of rules of conduct and a moral code sufficiently respected to justify the name of "International Law". But a period of social revolution combined with ruthless imperialism, leaves no room for neutrality, whether political, economic or moral. It may be that the world will transform itself into a number of closed zones isolated from each other. It may be that eventually a more closely knit world order will arise out of the present chaos. Or it may be that some imperialistic power achieves the mastery over at least a part of the world from which, after ruthless domination, a Pax Romana may eventually arise. These issues have to be fought out, and everyone, individual and nation, will have to take part in the struggle. While the struggle lasts, there can be no neutrality.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Whether it is attainable, how it can be attained, and what sort of world a world at peace will have to be

By H. G. Wells

(*Continued*)

The New Type of Revolution.

LET us return to our main purpose, which is to examine the way in which we are to face up to this impending World Revolution.

To many minds this idea of Revolution is almost inseparable from visions of street barricades made of paving-stones and overturned vehicles, ragged mobs armed with impromptu weapons and inspired by defiant songs, prisons broken and a general jail delivery, palaces stormed, a great hunting of ladies and gentlemen, decapitated but still beautiful heads on pikes, regicides of the most sinister quality, the busy guillotine, a crescendo of disorder ending in a whiff of grapeshot. . . .

That was one type of Revolution. It is what one might call the Catholic type of Revolution, that is to say it is the ultimate phase of a long period of Catholic living and teaching. People do not realize this and some will be indignant at its being stated so barely. Yet the facts stare us in the face, common knowledge, not to be denied. That furious, hungry, desperate, mob was the outcome of generations of Catholic rule, Catholic morality and Catholic education. The King of France was the "Most Christian King, the eldest son of the Church", he was master of the economic and financial life of the community, and the Catholic Church controlled the intellectual life of the community and the education of the people absolutely. That mob was the outcome. It is absurd

o parrot that Christianity has never been tried. Christianity n its most highly developed form has been tried and tried gain. It was tried for centuries fully and completely, in Spain, France, Italy. It was responsible for the filth and hronic pestilence and famine of medieval England. It nculcated purity but it never inculcated cleanliness. Catholic Christianity had practically unchallenged power in France for enerations. It was free to teach as it chose and as much s it chose. It dominated the common life entirely. The Catholic system in France cannot have reaped anything it did ot sow, for no other sowers were allowed. That hideous mob f murderous ragamuffins we are so familiar with in pictures f the period, was the final harvest of its *régime*.

The more Catholic reactionaries revile the insurgent common eople of the first French Revolution, the more they condemn hemselves. It is the most impudent perversion of reality r them to snivel about the guillotine and the tumbrils, as hough these were not purely Catholic products, as though ey came in suddenly from outside to wreck a genteel Paradise. hey were the last stage of the systematic injustice and norance of a strictly Catholic *régime*. One phase succeeded nother with relentless logic. The Marseillaise completed the fe-cycle of Catholicism.

In Spain too and in Mexico we have seen undisputed ducational and moral Catholic ascendency, the Church with a ee hand, producing a similar uprush of blind resentment. The owds there also were cruel and blasphemous ; but Catholicism annot complain ; for Catholicism hatched them. Priests and uns *who had been the sole teachers of the people* were insulted nd outraged and churches defiled. Surely if the Church is nything like what it claims to be, the people would have loved . They would not have behaved as though sacrilege was a atifying relief.

But these Catholic Revolutions are only specimens of one ngle type of Revolution. A Revolution need not be a ontaneous storm of indignation against intolerable indignities nd deprivations. It can take quite other forms.

As a second variety of Revolution, which is in sharp contrast ith the indignation-revolt in which so many periods of

unchallenged Catholic ascendency have ended, we may take what we may call the " revolution conspiracy ", in which a number of people set about organizing the forces of discomfort and resentment and loosening the grip of the government's forces, in order to bring about a fundamental change of system. The ideal of this type is the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia provided it is a little simplified and misunderstood. This, reduced to a working theory by its advocates, is conceived of as a systematic cultivation of a public state of mind favourable to a Revolution together with an inner circle of preparation for a " seizure of power ". Quite a number of Communist and other leftish writers, bright young men, without much political experience, have let their imaginations loose upon the " technique " of such an adventure. They have brought the Nazi and Fascist Revolutions into the material for their studies. Modern social structure with its concentration of directive, informative and coercive power about radio stations, telephone exchanges, newspaper offices, police stations, arsenals and the like, lends itself to quasi-gangster exploitation of this type. There is a great rushing about and occupation of key centres, an organized capture, imprisonment or murder of possible opponents, and the country is confronted with a *fait accompli*. The regimentation of the more or less reluctant population follows.

But a Revolution need be neither an explosion nor a *coup d'état*. And the Revolution that lies before us now as the only hopeful alternative to chaos, either directly or after an interlude of world communism, is to be attained, if it is attained at all, by neither of these methods. The first is too rhetorical and chaotic and leads simply to a Champion and tyranny ; the second is too conspiratorial and leads through an obscure struggle of masterful personalities to a similar end. Neither is lucid enough and deliberate enough to achieve a permanent change in the form and texture of human affairs.

An altogether different type of Revolution may or may not be possible. No one can say that it is possible unless it is tried, but one can say with some assurance that unless it can be achieved the outlook for mankind for many generations at least is hopeless. The new Revolution aims essentially at a chang

in directive ideas. In its completeness it is an untried method. It depends for its success upon whether a sufficient number of minds can be brought to realize that the choice before us now is *not* a choice between further revolution or more or less reactionary conservatism, but a choice between so carrying on and so organizing the process of change in our affairs as to produce a new world order, or suffering an entire and perhaps irreparable social collapse. Our argument throughout has been that things have gone too far ever to be put back again to any similitude of what they have been. We can no more dream of remaining where we are than think of going back in the middle of a dive. We must go through with these present changes, adapt ourselves to them, adjust ourselves to the plunge, or be destroyed by them. We must go through with these changes just as we must go through this ill-conceived war, because there is as yet no possible end for it.

There will be no possible way of ending it until the new Revolution defines itself. If it is patched up now without a clear-headed settlement understood and accepted throughout the world, we shall have only the simulacrum of a peace. A patched-up peace now will not even save us from the horrors of war, it will postpone them only to aggravate them in a few years time. You cannot end this war yet, you can at best adjourn it.

The reorganization of the world has at first to be mainly the work of a "movement" or a Party or a religion or cult, whatever we choose to call it. We may call it the New Liberalism or the New Radicalism or what not. It will not be a close-knit organization, toeing the Party line and so forth. It may be very loose-knit and many faceted, but if a sufficient number of minds throughout the world, irrespective of race, origin or economic and social habituations, can be brought to the free and candid recognition of the essentials of the human problem, then their effective collaboration in a conscious, explicit and open effort to reconstruct human society will ensue.

And to begin with they will do all they can to spread and perfect this conception of a new world order, which they will regard as the only working frame for their activities, while

at the same time they will set themselves to discover and associate with themselves, everyone, everywhere, who is intellectually able to grasp the same broad ideas and morally disposed to realize them.

The distribution of this essential conception one may call propaganda, but in reality it is education. The opening phase of this new type of Revolution must involve therefore a campaign for a re-invigorated and modernized education throughout the world, an education that will have the same ratio to the education of a couple of hundred years ago, as the electric lighting of a contemporary city has to the chandeliers and oil lamps of the same period. On its present mental levels humanity can do no better than what it is doing now.

Vitalizing education is only possible when it is under the influence of people who are themselves learning. It is inseparable from the modern idea of education that it should be knit up to incessant research. We say research rather than science. It is the better word because it is free from any suggestion of that finality which means dogmatism and death.

All education tends to become stylistic and sterile unless it is kept in close touch with experimental verification and practical work, and consequently this new movement of revolutionary initiative must at the same time be sustaining realistic political and social activities and working steadily for the collectivization of governments and economic life. The intellectual movement will be only the initiatory and correlating part of the new revolutionary drive. These practical activities must be various. Everyone engaged in them must be thinking for himself and not waiting for orders. The only dictatorship he will recognize is the dictatorship of the plain understanding and the invincible fact.

And if this culminating Revolution is to be accomplished then the participation of every conceivable sort of human being who has the mental grasp to see these broad realities of the world situation and the moral quality to do something about it, must be welcomed.

Previous revolutionary thrusts have been vitiated by bad psychology. They have given great play to the gratificatio of the inferiority complexes that arise out of class disadvantage

It is no doubt very unjust that anyone should be better educated, healthier and less fearful of the world than anyone else, but that is no reason why the new Revolution should not make the fullest use of the health, education, vigour and courage of the fortunate. The Revolution we are contemplating will aim at abolishing the bitterness of frustration. But certainly it will do nothing to avenge it. Nothing whatever. Let the dead past punish its dead.

It is one of the most vicious streaks in the Marxist teaching to suggest that all people of wealth and capacity living in a community in which uncoordinated private enterprise plays a large part are necessarily demoralized by the advantages they enjoy and that they must be dispossessed by the worker and the peasant, who are presented as endowed with a collective virtue capable of running all the complex machinery of a modern community. But the staring truth of the matter is that an uncoordinated scramble between individuals and nations alike, demoralizes all concerned. Everyone is corrupted, the filching tramp by the roadside, the servile hand-kissing peasant of Eastern Europe, the dole-bribed loafer, as much as the woman who marries for money, the company promoter, the industrial organizer, the rent-exacting landlord and the diplomatic agent. When the social atmosphere is tainted everybody is ill.

Wealth, personal freedom and education, may and do produce wasters and oppressive people, but they may also release creative and administrative minds to opportunity. The history of science and invention before the nineteenth century confirms this. On the whole if we are to assume there is anything good in humanity at all, it is more reasonable to expect it to appear when there is most opportunity.

And in further confutation of the Marxist caricature of human motives, we have the very considerable number of young people drawn from middle-class and upper-class homes, who figure in the extreme left movement everywhere. It is their moral reaction to the " stuffiness " and social ineffectiveness of their parents and their own sort of people. They seek an outlet for their abilities that is not gainful but serviceable. Many have sought an honourable life—and often found it, and death with

it—in the struggle against the Catholics and their Moorish and Fascist helpers in Spain.

It is a misfortune of their generation, that so many of them have fallen into the mental traps of Marxism. It has been my absurd experience to encounter noisy meetings of expensive young men at Oxford, not one of them stunted physically as I was by twenty years of under-nourishment and devitalized upbringing, all pretending to be rough-hewn collarless proletarians in shocked revolt against my bourgeois tyranny and the modest comfort of my declining years, and reciting the ridiculous class-war phrases by which they protected their minds from any recognition of the realities of the case. But though that attitude demonstrates the unstimulating education of their preparatory and public schools, which had thrown them thus uncritical and emotional into the problems of undergraduate life, it does not detract from the fact that *they had found the idea of abandoning themselves to a revolutionary reconstruction of society*, that promised to end its enormous waste of potential happiness and achievement, *extremely attractive*, notwithstanding that their own advantages seemed to be reasonably secure.

Faced with the immediate approach of discomfort, indignity, wasted years, mutilation—death is soon over but one wakes up again to mutilation every morning—because of this ill-conceived war; faced also by the reversion of Russia to autocracy and the fiscal extinction of most of the social advantages of their families; these young people with a leftish twist are likely not only to do some very profitable re-examination of their own possibilities but also to find themselves joined in that re-examination by a very considerable number of others who have hitherto been repelled by the obvious foolishness and insincerity of the hammer and sickle symbols (workers and peasants of Oxford!) and the exasperating dogmatism of the orthodox Marxist. And may not these young people, instead of waiting to be overtaken by an insurrectionary revolution, from which they will emerge greasy, unshaven, class-conscious and in incessant danger of liquidation, decide that before the Revolution gets hold of them they will get hold of the Revolution

and save it from the inefficiency, mental distortions, disappointments and frustrations that have overtaken it in Russia.

This new and complete Revolution we contemplate can be defined in a very few words. It is (*a*) outright world-socialism, scientifically planned and directed, *plus* (*b*) a sustained insistence upon law, law based on a fuller, more jealously conceived restatement of the personal Rights of Man, *plus* (*c*) the completest freedom of speech, criticism and publication, and a sedulous expansion of the educational organization to the ever-growing demands of the new order. What we may call the Eastern or Bolshevik Collectivism, the Revolution of the *Internationale*, has failed to achieve even the first of these three items and it has never even attempted the other two.

Putting it at its compactest, it is the triangle of Socialism, Law and Knowledge, which frames the Revolution which may yet save the world.

Socialism ! Become outright collectivists ? Very few men of the more fortunate classes in our old collapsing society who are over fifty will be able to readjust their minds to that. It will seem an entirely repulsive suggestion to them. But it need not be repulsive at all to their sons. They will be impoverished anyhow. The stars in their courses are seeing to that. And that will help them greatly to realize that an administrative and constructive life may be far more interesting than a life of mere acquisition and spending.

From administrative control to administrative participation and then to direct administration are easy steps. They are being taken now, first in one matter and then in another. On both sides of the Atlantic. Reluctantly and often very disingenuously and against energetic but diminishing resistances. Great Britain, like America, may become a Socialist system without a definitive Revolution, protesting all the time that it is doing nothing of the sort.

In Britain we have now no distinctively educated class, but all up and down the social scale there are well-read men and women who have thought intensely upon these great problems we have been discussing. To many of them and maybe to enough of them to start the avalanche of purpose that will certainly develop from a clear and determined beginning, this

conception of Revolution to evoke a liberal collectivized world may appeal. And so at last we narrow down our enquiry to an examination of what has to be done now to save the Revolution, what the movement or its Party—so far as it may use the semblance of a Party—will do, what its Policy will be. Hitherto we have been demonstrating why a reasonable man, of any race or language anywhere, should become a "Western" Revolutionary. We have now to review the immediate activities to which he can give himself.

Politics for the Sane Man.

Let us restate the general conclusions to which our preceding argument has brought us.

The establishment of a progressive world socialism in which the freedom, health and happiness of every individual are protected by a universal law based on a re-declaration of the rights of man, and wherein there is the utmost liberty of thought, criticism and suggestion, is the plain, rational objective before us now. Only the effective realization of this objective can establish peace on earth and arrest the present march of human affairs to misery and destruction. We cannot reiterate this objective too clearly and too frequently. The triangle of collectivization, law and knowledge should embody the common purpose of all mankind.

But between us and that goal intervenes the vast and deepening disorders of our time. The new order cannot be brought into existence without a gigantic and more or less co-ordinated effort of the saner and abler elements in the human population. The thing cannot be done rapidly and melodramatically. That effort must supply the frame for all sane social and political activities *and a practical criterion for all religious and educational associations.* But since our world is multitudinously varied and confused, it is impossible to narrow down this new revolutionary movement to any single class, organization or Party. It is too great a thing for that. It will in its expansion produce and perhaps discard a number of organizations and parties, converging upon its ultimate objective. Consequently, in order to review the social and political activities

of sane, clear-headed people to-day, we have to deal with them piecemeal from a number of points of view. We have to consider an advance upon a long and various front.

Let us begin then with the problem of sanity in face of the political methods of our time. What are we to do as voting citizens? There I think the history of the so-called democracies in the past half-century is fairly conclusive. Our present electoral methods which give no choice but a bilateral choice to the citizen and so force a two party system upon him, is a mere caricature of representative government. It has produced upon both sides of the Atlantic, big, stupid, and corrupt Party machines. That was bound to happen and yet to this day there is a sort of shyness in the minds of young men interested in politics when it comes to discussing Proportional Representation. They think it is a "bit faddy". At best it is a side issue. Party politicians strive to maintain that bashfulness, because they know quite clearly that what is called Proportional Representation with the single transferable vote in large constituencies, returning a dozen members or more, is extinction for the mere party hack and destruction for party organizations.

The machine system in the United States is more elaborate, more deeply entrenched legally in the Constitution and illegally in the spoils system, and it may prove more difficult to modernize than the British, which is based on an outworn caste tradition. But both Parliament and Congress are essentially similar in their fundamental quality. They trade in titles, concessions and the public welfare, and they are only amenable in the rough and at long last to the movements of public opinion. It is an open question whether they are much more responsive to popular feeling than the Dictators we denounce so unreservedly as the antithesis of democracy. They betray a great disregard of mass responses. They explain less. They disregard more. The Dictators have to go on talking and talking, not always truthfully but they have to talk. A dumb Dictator is inconceivable.

In such times of extensive stress and crisis as the present, the baffling slowness, inefficiency and wastefulness of the party system become so manifest that some of its worst pretences are put aside. The party game is suspended. His Majesty's

Opposition abandons the pose of safeguarding the interests o the common citizens from those scoundrels upon the governmen benches ; Republicans and Democrats begin to cross the Party line to discuss the new situation. Even the men who live professionally by the Parliamentary (Congressional) imposture abandon it if they are sufficiently frightened by the posture o affairs. The appearance of an All-Party National Governmen in Great Britain before very long seems inevitable.

Great Britain has in effect gone socialist in a couple of months she is also suspending party politics. Just as the United State did in the great slump. And in both cases this has happened because the rottenness and inefficiency of party politics stank to heaven in the face of danger. And since in both cases Party Government threw up its hands and bolted, is there any conceivable reason why we should let it come back at any appearance of victory or recovery, why we should not go ahead from where we are to a less impromptu socialist *régime* under a permanent non-party administration, to the reality if not to the form of a permanent socialist government ?

Now here I have nothing to suggest about America, I have never, for example, tried to work out the consequences of the absence of executive ministers from the legislature. I am inclined to think that is one of the weak points in the Constitution and that the English usage which exposes the Minister to question time in the House and makes him a prime mover in legislation affecting his department, is a less complicated and therefore more democratic arrangement than the American one. And the powers and functions of the President and the Senate are so different from the consolidated powers of Cabinet and Prime Minister, that even when an Englishman has industriously " mugged up " the constitutional points, he is still almost as much at a loss to get the living reality as he would be if he were shown the score of an opera before hearing it played or the blue prints of a machine he had never seen in action. Very few Europeans understand the history of Woodrow Wilson, the Senate and his League of Nations. They think that " America " which they imagine as a large single individual, planted the latter institution upon Europe and then deliberately shuffled out of her responsibility for it, and they will never think other

wise. And they think that "America" kept out of the war to the very limit of decency, overcharged us for munitions that contributed to the common victory, and made a grievance because the consequent debt was not discharged. They talk like that while Americans talk as if no English were killed between 1914 and 1918 (we had 800,000 dead) until the noble American conscripts came forward to die for them (to the tune of about 50,000). Savour for example even the title of Quincy Howe's *England expects every American to do his Duty*. It's the meanest of titles, but many Americans seem to like it.

On my desk as I write is a pamphlet by a Mr. Robert Randall, nicely cyclostyled and got up, which urges a common attack on the United States as a solution of the problem of Europe. No countries will ever feel united unless they have a common enemy, and the natural common enemy for Europe, it is declared, is the United States. So to bring about the United States of Europe we are to begin by denouncing the Monroe doctrine. I believe in the honesty and good intentions of Mr. Robert Randall; he is, I am sure, no more in the pay of Germany, direct or indirect, than Mr. Quincy Howe or Mr. Harry Elmer Barnes; but could the most brilliant of Nazi war propagandists devise a more effective estranging suggestion? . . .

But I wander from my topic. I do not know how sane men in America are going to set about relaxing the stranglehold of the Constitution, get control of their own country out of the hands of those lumpish, solemnly cunning politicians with their great strong jowls developed by chewing-gum and orotund speaking, whose photographs add a real element of frightfulness to the pages of *Time*, how they are going to abolish the spoils system, discover, and educate to expand a competent civil service able to redeem the hampered promises of the New Deal and pull America into line with the reconstruction of the rest of the world. But I perceive that in politics and indeed in most things, the underlying humour and sanity of Americans are apt to find a way round and do the impossible, and I have as little doubt they will manage it somehow as I have when I see a street performer on his little chair and carpet, all tied up with chains, waiting until there are sufficient pennies in the hat to justify exertion.

These differences in method, pace and tradition are a great misfortune to the whole English-speaking world. We English people do not respect Americans enough ; we are too disposed to think they are all Quincy Howes and Harry Elmer Barneses and Borahs and suchlike, conceited and suspicious anti-British monomaniacs, who must be humoured at any cost ; which is why we are never so frank and rude with them as they deserve But the more we must contain ourselves the less we love them Real brothers can curse each other and keep friends. Someday Britannia will give Columbia a piece of her mind, and that may clear the air. Said an exasperated Englishman to me a day or so ago : "I pray to God they keep out of the end of *this* war anyhow. We shall never hear the last of it if they don't. . . ."

Yet at a different pace our two peoples are travelling towards identical ends, and it is lamentable that a difference of accent and idiom should do more mischief than a difference of language

So far as Great Britain goes things are nearer and closer to me, and it seems to me that there is an excellent opportunity now to catch the country in a state of socialization and suspended party politics, and keep it at that. It is a logical but often disregarded corollary of the virtual creation of All-Party National Governments and the suspension of electoral contests that since there is no Opposition, party criticism should give place to individual criticism of Ministers, and that instead of throwing out governments we should set ourselves to throw out individual administrative failures. We need no longer confine our choice of public servants to political careerists. We can insist upon men who have done things and can do things, and whenever an election occurs we can organize a block of non-party voters who will vote if possible for an outsider of proved ability and will at any rate insist on a clear statement from every Parliamentary candidate of the concrete service, if any, he has done the country, of his past and present financial entanglements and his family relationships and of any title he possesses. We can get these necessary particulars published and note what newspapers decline to do so. And if there are still only politicians to vote for, we can at least vote and spoil our voting cards by way of protest.

At present we see one public service after another in a mess

through the incompetent handling of some party hack and the unseen activities of interested parties. People are asking already why Sir Arthur Salter is not in control of Allied Shipping again, Sir John Orr directing our food supply with perhaps Sir Frederick Keeble to help him, Sir Robert Vansittart in the Foreign Office. We want to know the individuals responsible for the incapacity of our Intelligence and Propaganda Ministries so that we may induce them to quit public life. It would be quite easy now to excite a number of anxious people with a cry for " Competence not Party ".

Most people in the British Isles are heartily sick of Mr. Chamberlain and his government, but they cannot face up to a political split in wartime, and Mr. Chamberlain sticks to office with all the pertinacity of a Barnacle. But if we do not attack the Government as a whole, but individual ministers, and if we replace them one by one, we shall presently have a government so rejuvenated that even Mr. Chamberlain will realize and accept his superannuation. Quite a small body of public-spirited people could organize an active Vigilance Society to keep these ideas before the mass of voters and begin the elimination of inferior elements from our public life. This would be a practical job of primary importance in our political regeneration. It would lead directly to a new and more efficient political structure to carry on after the present war has collapsed or otherwise ended.

Following upon this campaign for the conclusive internment of the played-out party system, there comes the necessity for a much more strenuous search for administrative and technical ability throughout the country. We do not want to miss a single youngster who can be of use in the great business of making over Great Britain, which has been so rudely, clumsily and wastefully socialized by our war perturbations, so that it may become a permanently efficient system.

And from the base of the educational pyramid up to its apex of higher education for teachers, heads of departments and research, there is need for such a quickening of minds and methods as only a more or less organized movement of sanely critical men can bring about. We want Ministers now of the highest quality in every department, but in no department of

public life is a man of creative understanding, bold initiative and administrative power so necessary as in the Education Ministry.

So tranquil and unobtrusive has been the flow of educational affairs in the British Empire that it seems almost scandalous, and it is certainly "vulgar", to suggest that we need an Educational Ginger Group to discover and support such a Minister. We want a Minister of Education who can shock teachers into self-examination, electrify and rejuvenate old dons or put them away in ivory towers, and stimulate the younger ones. Under the party system the Education Ministry has always been a restful corner for some deserving party politician with an abject respect for his Alma Mater and permanent officials. During war time, when other departments wake up, the Education Department sinks into a deeper lethargy. One cannot recall a single British Education Minister, since there have been such things in our island story as Ministers for Education, who signified anything at all educationally or did anything of his own impulse that was in the least worth while.

Suppose we found a live one—soon—and let him rip!

There again is something to be done far more revolutionary than throwing bombs at innocent policemen or assassinating harmless potentates or ex-potentates. And yet it is only asking that an existing Department be what it pretends to be.

A third direction in which any gathering accumulation of sanity should direct its attention is the clumsy unfairness and indirectness of our present methods of expropriating the former well-to-do classes. The only observable principle seems to be widows and children first. Socialization is being effected in Britain and America alike not by frank expropriation (with or without compensation) but by increasing government control and increasing taxation. Both our great communities are going into socialism backward and without ever looking round. This is good in so far as that technical experience and directive ability is changed over step by step from entirely private employment to public service, and on that side sane and helpful citizens have little to do beyond making the process conscious of itself and the public aware of the real nature of the change, but it is bad in its indiscriminate destruction of savings,

which are the most exposed and vulnerable side of the old system. They are expropriated by profit-control and taxation alike, and at the same time they suffer in purchasing power by the acceleration of that process if monetary inflation which is the unavoidable readjustment, the petition in bankruptcy, of a community that has overspent.

The shareholding class dwindles and dies; widows and orphans, the old who are past work and the infirm who are incapable of it, are exposed to a painful shrinkage of their modes of living; there is no doubt a diminution of social waste, but also there is an indirect impoverishment of free opinion and free scientific and artistic initiative as the endless societies, institutions and services which have enriched life for us and been very largely supported by voluntary subscriptions, shrivel. At present a large proportion of our scientific, artistic, literary and social workers are educated out of the private savings fund. In a class-war revolution these economically very defenceless but ocially very convenient people are subjected to vindictive umiliation—it is viewed as a great triumph for their meaner eighbours—but a revolution sanely conducted will probably vise a system of terminable annuities and compensation, and of sistance to once voluntary associations, which will ease off e social dislocations due to the disappearance of one stratum relatively free and independent people, before its successors, t is to say the growing class of retired officials, public ninistrators and so forth, finds its feet and develops its own thods of assertion and enterprise.

Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Let us turn now to another system of problems in the lectivization of the world, and that is the preservation liberty in the socialist state and the restoration of that nfidence without which good behaviour is generally impossible. This destruction of confidence is one of the less clearly ognized evils of the present phase of world-disintegration. the past there have been periods when whole communities at least large classes within communities have gone about ir business with a general honesty, directness and sense of

personal honour. They have taken a keen pride in the quality of their output. They have lived through life on tolerable and tolerant terms with their neighbours. The laws they observed have varied in different countries and periods, but their general nature was to make an orderly law-abiding life possible and natural. They had been taught and they believed and they had every reason to believe: "This (that or the other things) is right. Do right and nothing except by some strange exceptional misfortune, can touch you. The Law guarantees you that. Do right and nothing will rob you or frustrate you."

Nowhere in the world now is there very much of that feeling left, and as it disappears, the behaviour of people degenerates towards a panic scramble, towards cheating, over-reaching, gang organization, precautionary hoarding, concealment and all the meanness and anti-social feeling which is the natural outcome of insecurity.

Faced with what now amounts to something like a moral stampede, more and more sane men will realize the urgency for restoration of confidence. The more socialization proceeds and the more directive authority is concentrated, the more necessary is an efficient protection of individuals from the impatience of well-meaning or narrow-minded or ruthless officials and indeed from all the possible abuses of advantage that are inevitable under such circumstances to our still childishly wicked breed.

In the past the Atlantic world has been particularly successful in expedients for meeting this aspect of human nature. Our characteristic and traditional method may be called the method of the fundamental declaration. Our Western peoples, by a happy instinct, have produced statements of Right, from Magna Carta onwards, to provide a structural defence between the citizen and the necessary growth of central authority.

And plainly the successful organization of the more universal and penetrating collectivism that is now being forced upon us all will be frustrated in its most vital aspect unless its organization is accompanied by the preservative of a new Declaration of the Rights of Man, that must, because of the increasing complexity of the social structure, be more generous, detailed and explicit than any of its predecessors. Such a Declaration must become

the *common fundamental law* of all communities and collectivities assembled under the World Pax. It should be interwoven with the declared war aims of the combatant powers now; it should become the primary fact in any settlement; it should be put before the now combatant states for their approval, their embarrassed silence or their rejection.

In order to be as clear as possible about this, let me submit a draft for your consideration of this proposed Declaration of the Rights of Man—using "man" of course to cover every individual, male or female, of the species. I have endeavoured to bring in everything that is essential and to omit whatever secondary issues can be easily deduced from its general statements. It is a draft for your consideration. Points may have been overlooked and it may contain repetitions and superfluous statements.

Declaration of Rights.

Since a man comes into this world through no fault of his own, since he is a joint inheritor of the accumulations of the past, and since those accumulations are more than sufficient to satisfy the claims that are here made for him, it follows:

(1) That every man without distinction of race, of colour or of professed belief or opinions, is entitled to the nourishment, covering, medical care and attention needed to realize his full possibilities of physical and mental development and to keep him in a state of health from his birth to death.

(2) That he is entitled to sufficient education to make him a useful and interested citizen, that special education should be so made available as to give him equality or opportunity for the development of his distinctive abilities in the service of mankind, that he should have easy access to information upon all matters of common knowledge throughout his life and should enjoy the utmost freedom of discussion, association and worship.

(3) That he may engage freely in any lawful occupation, earning such wages as the need for his work and the increment it makes to the common welfare may justify. That he is entitled to paid employment and to a free choice when there is any variety of employment open to him. He may suggest employment for himself and have his claim publicly considered, accepted or dismissed.

(4) That he shall have the right to buy or sell without any discriminatory restrictions anything which may be lawfully bought or sold, in such quantities and with such reservations as are compatible with the common welfare.

Here I will interpolate a comment. We have to bear in mind that in a collectivist state buying and selling to secure value and profit will be not simply needless but impossible.

The Stock Exchange, after its career of four-hundred-odd-yea will necessarily vanish with the disappearance of any ratio motive either for large accumulations or for hoarding agai deprivation and destitution. Long before the age of compl collectivization arrives, the savings of individuals for la consumption will probably be protected by some developm of the Unit Trust System into a public service. They v probably be entitled to interest at such a rate as to compens for that secular inflation which should go on in a stead enriched world community. Inheritance and bequest in community in which the means of production and of all possi monopolization are collectivized, can concern little else th relatively small, beautiful and intimate objects, which v afford pleasure but no unfair social advantage to the receiver.

(5) That he and his personal property lawfully acquired are entit to police and legal protection from private violence, deprivation, compul and intimidation.

(6) That he may move freely about the world at his own expe That his private house or apartment or reasonably limited garden enclo is his castle, which may be entered only with his consent, but that he have the right to come and go over any kind of country, moor mountain, farm, great garden or what not, or upon the seas, lakes rivers of the world, where his presence will not be destructive of special use, dangerous to himself nor seriously inconvenient to his fe citizens.

(7) That a man, unless he is declared by a competent authority to danger to himself or to others through mental abnormality, a declar which must be annually confirmed, shall not be imprisoned for a period than six days without being charged with a definite offence a the law, nor for more than three months without a public trial. end of the latter period, if he has not been tried and sentenced b process of law, he shall be released. Nor shall he be conscripte military, police or any other service to which he has a conscient objection.

(8) That although a man is subject to the free criticism of his fellow shall have adequate protection from any lying or misrepresentation may distress or injure him. All registration and records about cit shall be open to their personal and private inspection. There shall secret dossiers in any administrative department. All dossiers sha accessible to the man concerned and subject to verification and corre at his challenge. A dossier is merely a memorandum; it cannot be u evidence without proper confirmation in open court.

(9) That no man shall be subject to any sort of mutilation or steril except with his own deliberate consent, freely given, nor to bodily a except in restraint of his own violence, nor to torture, beating or any bodily punishment; he shall not be subjected to imprisonment wit an excess of silence, noise, light or darkness as to cause mental su or to imprisonment in infected, verminous or otherwise insanitary qua

or be put into the company of verminous or infectious people. He shall not be forcibly fed nor prevented from starving himself if he so desire. He shall not be forced to take drugs nor shall they be administered to him without his knowledge and consent. That the extreme punishments to which he may be subjected are rigorous imprisonment for a term of not longer than fifteen years or death.

(Here I would point out that there is nothing in this to prevent ny country from abolishing the death penalty. Nor do I ssert a general right to commit suicide, because no one can unish a man for doing that. He has escaped. But threats nd incompetent attempts to commit suicide belong to an ntirely different category. They are indecent and distressing cts that can easily become a serious social nuisance, from which he normal citizen is entitled to protection.)

(10) That the provisions and principles embodied in this Declaration a shall be more fully defined in a code of fundamental human rights which shall be made easily accessible to everyone. This Declaration shall not be ul ualified nor departed from upon any pretext whatever. It incorporates all evious Declarations of Human Right. Henceforth for a new era it is e fundamental law for mankind throughout the whole world.

No treaty and no law affecting these primary rights shall be binding on any man or province or administrative division of the community, that has not been made openly, by and with the active or tacit acquiescence of every adult citizen concerned, either given by a direct majority vote of the community affected or through the majority vote of his publicly elected representatives. In matters of collective behaviour it is by the majority decision men must abide. No administration, under a pretext of urgency, convenience or the like, shall be entrusted with powers to create or further define offences or set up by-laws, which will in any way infringe the rights and liberties here asserted. All legislation must be public and definite. No secret treaties shall be binding on individuals, organizations or communities. No orders in council or the like shall be permitted. There is no source of law but the people, and since life flows on constantly to new citizens, no generation of the people can in whole or in part surrender or delegate the legislative power inherent in mankind.

There, I think, is something that keener minds than mine ay polish into a working Declaration which would in the most ective manner begin that restoration of confidence of which world stands in need. Much of it might be better phrased, I think it embodies the general good-will in mankind from to pole. It is certainly what we all want for ourselves. It d be a very potent instrument indeed in the present phase human affairs. It is necessary and it is acceptable. rporate that in your peace treaties and articles of federation, ould say, and you will have a firm foundation, which will

continually grow firmer, for the fearless cosmopolitan life of a new world order. You will never get that order without some such document. It is the missing key to endless contemporary difficulties.

And if we, the virtuous democracies, are not fighting for these common human rights, then what in the name of the nobility and gentry, the Crown and the Established Church, the City, *The Times* and the Army and Navy Club, are we common British peoples fighting for?

(*To be concluded*)

The New World Order will be published in book form by Messrs. Secker & Warburg

STRATEGY BY LAND, SEA AND AIR

1.—THE LAND

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

THE Russian invasion of Finland has re-awakened interest in the war on land. We have now to guess what are Stalin's, as well as Hitler's, intentions. Is he merely seizing the opportunity to strengthen his strategic position in the Baltic at the expense of Germany, or is the invasion of Finland only an initial step in a greater expansionist programme? Does he aim at securing an opening to the Atlantic at the expense of the Scandinavian countries? Has he designs to bring the Balkan Slavs into the Russian fold, or has he ambitions like those of the Tsarist *régime* which threatened our interests in India and the middle East?

These questions are being canvassed but whatever Stalin's intentions are it seems evident that he has started with a serious blunder in Finland. One can hardly doubt that he expected that the Finns would yield to threats, or at most that their resistance would not amount to more than a gesture if he resorted to actual use of force. There is a considerable amount of evidence that the determination of the Finns took him by surprise and that he was far from ready to overcome it. Obviously, his immediate object was to seize the strategic positions the surrender of which he had demanded in the course of negotiations. That is to say the Mannerheim Line and Viborg which defend the Karelian isthmus; Hangö, at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland; and Petsamo, the ice free port in the Arctic which serves the valuable nickel mines at Salmijärvi. The attack on Hangö was a particularly futile attempt, for time and again it has been proved that ships engage coast batteries at a great disadvantage. The batteries even if clearly visible form very small targets and they can

be put out of action only by a direct hit, whereas the ship presents a large target and one easy to range on. For a serious attempt to capture the place a well organized landing outside the range of the fortress guns would have been necessary. In this case, owing to the weakness of Finland's Air Force and the long extent of coast which has to be watched by her troops, possibly a feasible operation. The more obvious course would have been to concentrate on the defeat of the main Finnish Army which would automatically have led to the surrender of Hangö. If that had been Stalin's object there were various ways in which his navy could have co-operated with his army.

At Petsamo in the north there are similar indications of little expectation that serious opposition would be encountered; for though the port was seized without difficulty the troops which were landed ran out of supplies when they became engaged in further operations.

On the Karelian isthmus and on the north side of Lake Ladoga the Russian invasion was of a more formidable character. The troops used in the initial attack were of good quality and well equipped. The Finns, however, have offered stout resistance and reinforcements hurried up by the Russians appear to have been ill equipped and quite unfitted for a winter campaign. As was to be expected the Finns have been driven back from their forward positions. Additional reinforcements in large numbers are now said to be assembling behind the Russian front and a major attack supported by a heavy concentration of aircraft is expected. Whether it will succeed or not must depend on the skill and determination with which it is delivered. The restricted nature of the front in this case allows the advantages of the defensive to be fully exploited unless great disparity in the scale of armament of the opponents proves decisive. What we may, I think, conclude from the course of events, is that the original force deployed was probably no greater than would have been required to occupy the positions and country from which the Finnish Army was expected to retire, and to deal with such resistance as might be offered by determined groups. In fact that Stalin visualized the operation as the advance of an army of occupation which would encounter

little opposition. The absence of any serious attempt by the Navy to co-operate would seem to confirm this impression.

The most striking evidence that Stalin was relying on threats is given by the bombing of Helsinki on the first two days of the war. One cannot believe that he would, from humanitarian motives, have abstained from using his vast superiority of air power to the full extent of its potentialities if he had intended the attack to be crushing. Snowstorms may have prevented the immediate renewal of the attack to make the threat even more brutal than it was, but evidently there have been opportunities to renew it in subsequent days.

The only operation in the original Russian advance that seemed intended to deal with protracted resistance was the offensive across the waistline of Finland, aimed at Finnish communications with Sweden by the railway skirting the north end of the Gulf of Bothnia. This may have been because the central lake area of Finland is particularly favourable to prolonged guerilla resistance—resistance which could best be dealt with by cutting off supplies. The Russian offensive on this line, however, is likely itself to encounter many supply difficulties, as its own communications are vulnerable to guerilla attack in addition to the natural difficulties of the route and lack of roads.

What are the prospects of the Finns being able to maintain their resistance if Stalin employs the immense forces at his disposal to crush them? One or two attacks may be repulsed but the fact that the Russians have an inexhaustible supply of fresh troops with which to renew attacks can hardly fail to be decisive. The advantage of numbers is not so much the weight they give to the attack as the power they confer of bringing in fresh troops against troops becoming increasingly exhausted. Of recent years a good deal has been written discounting the value of numbers and exalting the powers of defence conferred by modern weapons. Yet numbers not only supply a reserve of fresh troops but enable points of attack to be multiplied and thereby produce results which, where forces are equal, can only be gained by mobility and skilful manœuvres. It is possible, too, to exaggerate the new powers of defence. For, holding the initiative, the offence can concentrate superiority of force at

the selected points of attack even where no great total superiority of numbers exists. That local superiority of numbers may prove decisive if troops are economically used. What modern weapons do undoubtedly confer is power of delaying action which may be used with advantage by a numerically inferior force where there is room for manœuvre in retreat. This power is, however, largely discounted where the terrain favours the free movement of mechanized troops and observation from the air, as was the case in Poland.

Applying these arguments to the Finnish situation we can see that the Mannerheim position in spite of its strength and restricted frontage lacks depth. It must, therefore, be held with a determination which will impose a great strain on troops subjected to repeated attacks and who have few reserves to provide relief.

Should, however, the Finns eventually have to retire from the isthmus they may, if they can conduct an orderly retreat, be able to delay further Russian advance for a long period. The terrain does not favour the movement of mechanized forces and it affords much cover from air observation. Moreover, the difficulties of maintaining supplies would probably limit the numbers of troops the Russians could maintain as the distance from their bases increases. The abandonment of the Mannerheim positions need not therefore bring Finnish resistance to an end, provided that the Finnish Army is not utterly exhausted in the attempt to hold it.

What will be interesting to learn is whether Stalin's entanglement in Finland will affect his power to supply Germany with Russia's surplus products. It may at least impose an additional strain on Russia's not too efficient railway system.

II.—THE SEA

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

TRUE to the principles laid down in that notorious book *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege**, issued by the German General Staff for the guidance of German officers, Germany has now removed every vestige of restriction upon the operations of her naval forces. The submarine protocol of 1936 is cast to the winds. The neutral has no rights. Neutral territory has not so far been violated, but the threat to Holland and the bullying attitude assumed towards Belgium and Sweden leave no doubt that if it shall suit her to attack them she will do so. There will then remain only the sinking of hospital ships to complete her record of international crime.†

Though the German submarines opened their operations with some regard to their engagements under the submarine protocol—with the exception of the sinking of the *Athenia* which will take its place in the world's remembrance with that of the *Lusitania*—that restraint was temporary only, and her observance was only partial. Her submarines, sent out in readiness before the war (planned by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Chamberlain, who most strangely had not made similar preparations to attack her) did it is true, on most occasions, in the early stage, summon the Merchantman with warning shots, did not torpedo vessels without warning, and permitted the crews to take to their boats. The protocol, however, laid down that the crews and passengers should be placed in a position of safety and did not acknowledge that an open boat in stormy seas and at a great distance from land or assistance, was so to be described: many of the sinkings took place in such conditions, resulting in a loss of many lives, both of the crews and of the passengers. Now, however, she has thrown off completely the thin mask with which she pretended to give a semblance of legality and adhesion to her word. Her submarines have returned to their practices of

*The German War Book. Translated by J. H. Morgan. John Murray. 1915.

†Germany sank fourteen hospital ships in the war of 1914-18.

1917-18. They sink without warning, any ships they meet. It is now plain that the German aim is deliberately to terrorize the weaker neutrals into desisting from all trading with Great Britain. Nor, indeed, does it matter to these new representatives of civilization whether the ships be bound for England or elsewhere. A Dutchman on her way to the Indies, or a Swede or Norwegian to Spain is fair game. Such protests as the neutrals may make are treated with contempt and the threat of invasion is held over their heads unless they comply with the demands to cease their traffic.

To add to this an indiscriminate mining has been adopted. The danger to neutral shipping which the development of the contact mine had created was observed by the world during the Russo-Japanese war; and the Hague Convention of 1907 made an attempt to set some limits upon the use of this weapon. Owing to the opposition of the German representative, and the support of some smaller Powers, the British proposals to forbid mining in the open sea were rejected, The convention consequently allowed the laying of mines in the open sea. It was accompanied by what has been described as no more than " benevolent expressions " which stultified the attempted safeguards. The provisos were that the positions of the mines should be made known to neutral shipping " *as soon as military exigencies permit* " ; and that mines should not be laid off an enemy's coast "*with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping* " : in other words, that a blockade by the use of mines was illegal. That elastic curiosity, the German conscience, was therefore free to decide what " military exigencies " were and how long those exigencies would last; and, as Sir Edward Satow pointed out, the second proviso would prove futile, since " a belligerent has merely to allege a different object to make it illusory as, for example, to prevent an enemy from finding shelter or receiving supplies from a port ". In fact, the convention was a sham, as Germany intended it should be. The dupes who supported him in its emasculation are perhaps now able to appreciate the effects. That sturdy defender of British sea power, the late Mr. Gibson Bowles, to whom eternal thanks are due for having saved the country from the " Declaration of London ", was abundantly right in his

criticisms of the then British Government in having "most unwisely" ratified the convention. "I feel myself absolutely confident," he then wrote, "that neither by the law of nations nor by any Convention whatever can the unrestricted and deliberate assassination of harmless neutrals by concealed mines be either sanctioned or justified. And I feel equally confident that if and when the question arises our Prize Courts will so decide."*

It has not fallen to our Prize Courts to make a decision, but to the Government itself; and the Government have so decided, with the result that retaliatory action in the form of stopping German exports has been ordered. The German cries out that this is illegal; a cruel war upon women and children. He should study the doctrines of his own country. Benevolence towards the community finds no place in them. "The errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst," wrote Clausewitz, "war is an act of violence which knows no bounds. The exhaustion, impoverishment and devastation of the whole country is the aim in war." The sole sanction which he recognized for observance of the laws of war is the fear of reprisals. Since it has seemed good to the German mind to render the sea unsafe for neutral navigation and to commit open murder upon neutrals on the sea she has no cause to complain, and no standing for complaint, if retaliatory action, is taken. The neutral is too weak to defend his own interests and the lives of his countrymen. Retaliation is, admittedly, a two-edged weapon: once breaches of the law are begun and retaliation ensues, the end cannot be foreseen. The rights of retaliation are governed by the proviso that the acts are not excessive in comparison with the injuries, and Japan has apparently advanced the view that the Order-in-Council is excessive. But it is probable that if floating mines were laid off the approaches to Osaka, Yokohama and Nagasaki in an attempt illegally to blockade Japan her attitude towards the situation would be markedly different.

It is indeed a curious trait of the German character that while he resorts to the use of force without limit, proclaims ruthlessness as the ruling principle of war, insists that humanitarian claims,

**The Times*, September 9, 1914.

such as the protection of civilians and their goods, can only be taken into consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit, he cries out in impassioned tones for sympathy when a modicum of his own principles is applied to himself. He has shown small sympathy with the fate of women and children, when he invaded Poland, when the *Deutschland* bombarded the open town of Almeria or when he besieged Paris in 1870; nor, when he sent out his submarines in anticipation of war, in the hopes of starving England, was the suffering of women and children to be any restraint upon their action, which, indeed, had no other aim than starvation. The cry, however, of starvation is a false cry, and those who in this country allow themselves to be taken in by the German propaganda would do well to read the excellent pamphlet written by Sir William Beveridge on the subject.* In this analysis the fact is made clear that no sea blockade which the Allies can bring into operation will starve the German people, who have the food resources of Europe open to them. "Nothing that Britain is able to do can prevent German women and children from being fed or secure that they are fed. That decision lies in the hands of the Nazi party and their Soviet friends." That is an elemental truth which cannot be too widely understood. Germany possesses—and indeed boasts that she possesses—adequate supplies of all sorts of foodstuffs except fats. It lies with her Government to decide how those supplies are used. It can if it chooses devote them to feeding the guns, as it has done for the last few years: or it can devote them to feeding the people. The choice is theirs: and they, of all people with the *Kriegsbrauch in Landkrieg* and *Mein Kampf* as their bibles are the last who are entitled to complain when the Allied seapower is used to weaken their military effort by a reduction of their supply and of the raw materials of munitions.

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The narrow seas are a scene of strenuous work as they were in the last war. In a new book of Reminiscences Admiral Bacon resumes his comments on the Dover Patrol.†

*Blockade add the Civil Population. Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs. No. 24. 3d.

†From 1910 Onward, by Admiral Sir R. H. Bacon. Hutchinson. 21s.

Though the situation to-day is different, the enemy having as yet no footing in the Low Countries, this addition to the Admiral's previous works on the Dover Patrol is interesting. He makes some well-weighed observations on the planning of operations in general, he shows the difficulties of the work in the Straits. He ranges over a wide experience in many activities, from the development of the submarine to the production of 15-inch howitzers and the management of the Ministry of Munitions : and if in some pages he is bitter the reader can form an opinion as to whether he has cause for bitterness. One thing, in particular, he shows : that we took life at sea and the deeper study of war too lightly in the years between 1900 and 1914.

III.—THE AIR

By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton

THE peculiarities of this Great War increase as time goes on, and in some respects, it does indeed answer to the description 'phoney' as dubbed by Mr. Henry Ford. The three main contestants are in it up to their necks, straining every nerve and tissue to accumulate a vast reserve of force, and yet so little kinetic energy do the cars of Juggernaut possess that its Finnish offshoot is being accorded space priority in the organs of the Press. Only on the water are there signs of life, or death, as the tale of sinking rises and the U-boat plunges to its doom.

Even in the air, where at least there is freedom of manœuvre still, an unexpected hesitancy clogs the wings of flight, repeating in that element, though with a more liberal interpretation, the state of equipoise that reigns upon the ground. An enormous amount of preventive work is being done by the Coastal Command, which flies unceasingly, and daily, a mileage that is greater than the earth's circumference on its various duties out at sea. The North Sea is quartered by its aircraft as if it were a chequer-board, it hunts successfully the submarine, it overlooks the safety of the convoys and, on occasion, they have assisted disabled warships home to port. But otherwise the air activity is universally subdued. The units of the Home Defence are continually alert and at their stations, and lose no opportunity of measuring their prowess against the enemy when he raids or reconnoitres. In this vital duty they have indeed scored a series of outstanding successes, but there again it is purely defensive work and bears no real relation to the offensive power which air force has in leash and ready to discharge. On the Western Front it is much the same. Just as on the ground there is patrol activity and small offensives of a strictly local nature, so up above there is intermittent scrapping when a clash fortuitously occurs and, besides that, those puzzling reconnaissance flights, mainly conducted in the hours of darkness, which, we have it on the best authority, possess considerable

value. It is not for the general public to question the high necessity of these daring flights far over enemy territory, but it would be grateful for discreet enlightenment as to their underlying purpose and to the results that are achieved. The Air Force casualty roll is mounting and it is only natural to presume that a proportion of the loss therein recorded may be attributed to this particular form of flight.

No one would suggest that either side should immediately have recourse to the form of bombing that endangers civilian life in mass. That phase of warfare from the air has been plainly put aside for the present and may never be reached. It is reserved, apparently, for use against those weak opponents who do not dispose of considerable air power, and whose ability to reciprocate is therefore small or non-existent. We have seen the system at work in Poland, and may see soon a repetition further to the north when the Finnish power of resistance wanes. But in the case of two air powers not too unevenly matched, whose Home Defence is strong and whose main centres of population are equally attainable, the sheer absurdity of such form of mutual destruction must appeal to the most brutish brain. Apart from that, however, there must be a host of objectives possessing a purely military significance on which continual or repeated air attack cannot but obtain result. We have them by the score and the enemy's ventures against Scapa Flow, the Firth of Forth and the Shetland sea-base are instances in point. The fact that these attempts on our Fleet and on our Fleet Air Arm have decreased of late is no doubt partly due to the ill-success of the endeavour. But much more is it attributable to the not unsuccessful offensive which the enemy is conducting, by mine, torpedo and by ocean raider, against our shipping, a method of inflicting loss that is satisfying for the moment because the result is soon apparent for all the world to know. As an offset to this condition of affairs we are heavily, and not unsuccessfully, engaged on the economic sea-front of our enemy, we have beached his mercantile marine for the duration of the war, and we have administered a crushing blow to his U-boat fleet. Economically the balance is decidedly in our favour, though it is unfortunate that Eastern Europe is a huge back area from which the enemy can draw a large propor-

tion of the consumable supplies and raw material that he must have for the prosecution of the war. In that wide-spread region the British Navy cannot operate its stranglehold and Nazi resistance to economic warfare must therefore be prolonged.

And yet he also has his vulnerable points and we our purely military and legitimate objectives, attainable by air. We have already smoked out three at widely separated intervals, Brunsbuttel, Borkum and Heligoland to wit, though in the aggregate this does not represent a large endeavour for three months of war. The significant fact is that on the two latter occasions our aircraft came off scot-free from the enemy's defences, ground and air, implying that we are improving in the technique of approach and amassing the most useful of all experience in the subtleties of surprise attack. On the face of it our energies might be well directed to more frequent repetition of this form of enterprise, which would be carrying the offensive to the enemy and, in some sort, off-setting the depression caused by his toll of casualties to our mercantile marine. This is doubtless much in the minds of those responsible for our strategy in the air, and an increase of these activities may be confidently looked for in the near future. There are tempting targets all along the North Sea coast of Germany and beyond. If the enemy can fly as far afield as Scapa Flow and Lerwick, in the Shetlands, we can at least reach Stettin in the Bay of Pomerania. It is readily believable that in the air, as on the ground, we are crouching for a spring, and that when we feel assured of a sufficient weight of reserves behind us we will let fly in all directions. The promises of Canada are bright and our home establishments, both industrial and training, are working overtime to turn out flying crews and aircraft. There is not the slightest doubt that ere long we will not lack either for equipment or personnel, bidding fair even greatly to surpass the Nazi output. But in the interim the enemy's sea offensive proceeds apace and without cessation. Intermittent raids, on one occasion by machine-gun bullets only, on the Nazi coastal bases, whatever the success which may attend them short of major victory, may be inspiriting to our morale, and possibly can do effective damage, but they provide no adequate reply, unless the tempo quickens up considerably,

to the enemy's persistent blows to our marine. Neutral opinion, moreover, so largely saturated with German propaganda, is being subtly taught to belittle these performances and, in some cases, to deride the claims which we advance for a complete success. We cannot afford to neglect this body of opinion, for the goodwill of the neutral Powers is indirectly a reinforcement to our strength, and the more they are convinced in the face of propaganda that we hold our own and more the readier they will be to assist us in the intricacies of our dealings with them in matters affecting the blockade.

THE NEW EUROPE

By Storm Jameson

IT is possible that Europe cannot now be saved. The most optimistic, the best-grounded belief in the victory of France and England, cannot make less of the fact that we have been driven into a position of extreme danger. The course of the war can be predicted with confidence but not with certainty. Western civilization has made the mistake of having a second Great War, and such persistent silliness might turn out to be incurable. Our civilization—it is conceivable—might be too silly to live. Its future historian, probably Chinese, would disentangle the various causes of its decay, economic nationalism, the shortsightedness or ignorance of some national leaders, the power lust of others. He would find that in the First Great War men who proposed to study and attempt to cure the deeper causes of the instability leading to war were rebuked for not realizing that the important thing was to win; that precisely the same arguments were urged in the Second Great War. He might perhaps decide that the root cause of the decay of civilization in the twentieth century was nothing more and nothing less than atrophy of the imagination.

The grounds on which we hope for a military victory are good. It would be foolish to expect defeat and damned foolish to count on easy or even on wholly satisfactory victory.

It is difficult to be sure on what English people do now count. The lack of visible excitement, the matter-of-fact patience, on which foreign observers have commented, are not the whole story. Very many people, not pacifists, are profoundly perplexed. They accept the fact of war, they do their duty by the war, but they remain baffled, deeply uneasy, often without being able to put their bewilderment into words. The fault is not theirs. It is not their fault that the words 'We are fighting to end Hitlerism' wake an echo—'We are fighting to

end Kaiserism '—and that with the echo comes the hollow feeling of standing in a place of echoes. The labour of a Churchill to roar loud enough to drown it is wasted. You cannot silence an echo by shouting. Every young man leaving his house in new khaki uniform is accompanied by one or two or three dead young men, also in khaki, and it is in fact their presence, their constant mute ' What, again ? ' which gives us this sense of emptiness, of questions unanswered. As the war goes on this feeling will spread and strengthen. There are ways of dealing with it. One is to go on talking with blithe Fourth Form cheerfulness about destroying Hitlerism. Another is the Churchill way of calling up contempt and hatred of the enemy. Both are the worse for wear, and the second corrupts.

If the echoes are to be silenced, if the hidden bewilderment is to be checked, we must be given hope that this war is being fought to secure something better than another brief interval of ' peace ' before another breakdown. Statesmen who do not realize this, publicists who make light of it, are, in a real sense, in a sense the future will make bitterly clear, enemies of the people.

The immediate cause of the war is the inflamed nationalism which divides the States of Europe politically, economically, and to a varying extent socially. The situation was always dangerous. It became more dangerous at each stage of the policy of financial and economic restriction. It became abnormally dangerous after March, 1933.

Governments which adopt policies of restriction may do so in defence of the existing power and interests of their country. Or with the deliberate intention of establishing a self-sufficiency which will aid them in extending their power by force. In the Marxian thesis governments are the façade behind which ' monopoly capitalism ' ruthlessly pursues its own interests, and precipitates war when these interests are threatened by external rivals or by internal revolution. This thesis is too crude to be valuable. There can be no question that the influence on a national government of powerful interests is socially anarchic and a threat to peace. The influence of a Great Interest is not used with a view to benefiting the nation as a whole. It is used to advance the power of the particular Great Interest.

The member of the *Comité des Forges* who said, '*Monsieur, quand les intérêts atteignent à l'ampleur des nôtres, ils se confondent avec l'intérêt national*', was talking through his balance sheet. It is to the interest of a particular industry to acquire subsidies, to set up tariff walls against foreign competitors, and a powerful industry does not hesitate to bring pressure on its government to achieve these ends. It urges arguments of national interest. If it were possible for Great Britain to pursue policies of restriction in isolation it would have an advantage over the rest of the world. But restriction is countered by restriction; trade barriers rise everywhere; international commerce and finance are dislocated; the unemployment in countries, temporarily relieved, worsens. That the aggravated state of tension, political and economic, will encourage and seem to justify warlike policies in one or more countries is inevitable. The government did not intend this when it agreed with the gentlemen of the *Comité des Forges* or of the Federation of British Industres. Nor did the Federation of British Industries.

The monumental egoism and the crass stupidity of these people—in the long run their policy operates even against themselves—do not justify the Marxian thesis. A particular industry which is pressing the government for restrictive legislation does not do so in the teeth of enlightened Trades Union opposition, aware that restrictions are not in the interests of the workers as a whole. The pressure is applied by competing industries, not by capitalists as a class. Restrictions on immigration, a serious cause of international tension, are upheld by the Trades Unions—exactly as it was self-interest and not enthusiasm which made the English Trades Union leaders anxious to see the standard of living raised among the workers of other countries. The extent to which the official leaders of the workers are able to identify their interests with those of the capitalist owners of industry is a matter for congratulation or irony, as you like. It disposes of the spectre of 'monopoly capitalism' plotting war.

Europe in the interval between our two Great Wars seemed to be choking itself to death. Trade channels dried up, money ceased to circulate, barriers were raised against the movement of people and ideas. It is not a new spectacle. It is a return,

at a more complex level, to an old one. Only for a short period during the nineteenth century was there a Western European movement against the policy of restrictive laws and tariffs. It did not last. In Bismarck and post-Bismarck Europe, political imperialism and the sectional demands of Great Interests helped each other to bring on us a disastrous Great War and a disastrous peace.

The strain of the 1914-1918 War forced the Allies to set up an economic organization of the sort which has just been re-started between this country and France. Machinery was created for the joint administration of transport and the supply of raw materials and food. It worked with conspicuous success. So well, in fact, that the attempt was made to continue the system after the War with the intention of extending it to neutrals and to the enemy nations. The plan was smothered in infancy by the United States, rich enough at the end of the last war to get away with murder. On November 8th, 1918, a despatch from Washington destroyed the only chance the world had of being able to say that some millions of men did not die uselessly. 'After peace over one-half of the whole export food supplies of the world will come from the United States, and for the buyers of these supplies to sit in majority dictation to us as to prices and distribution, is wholly inconceivable.' Thus nothing of value for the future came out of the deaths. The League of Nations, deprived of economic co-operation, was crippled. The outlines of a new world, shocking to sound business sense, were hurriedly erased. There is no likelihood that an English spokesman of the interests concerned would, in the same circumstances, have made a different answer.

Left to pull themselves together as best they could, the older European democracies were chiefly anxious to make themselves secure. The demand for security came from all parties and sections, from industrialists demanding subsidies and restrictive tariffs, from Trades Unions demanding fixed wages, from agriculture demanding tax reliefs and fair prices. The impulse was as much a matter of morale as of economics. In talking of the moral shock of the War we are talking of an effect which can neither be measured nor denied. Four years of organized slaughter exhausted, and roused fears and a sense of guilt

which found expression in cynicism, real and assumed, a taste for Real-politik, a disbelief in the value and dignity of the individual.

Propaganda for restrictions on trade and immigration, for subsidies and protection, went down easily in a disorganized world. The great slump which followed the great boom gave an opportunity to powerful industrialist interests which they did not miss. The Smoot-Hawley tariff system was followed by Ottawa. Both measures had as a result a further dislocation of world trade and a sharpening of international tension. Without respect to Beaverbrook and the Federation of British Industries it was a sight too much to pay for the sectional advantages achieved.

We are accustomed to regard as normal and proper that aspect of economic nationalism which a government pursues when it takes steps to see that the country is not excluded from trading with and investing in territories abroad, or cut off from essential supplies. So long as the world is partitioned between rival sovereignties it is clear that a government which neglected its opportunities in this struggle for economic strength would be behaving with a highmindedness it could not justify to its traders when these were excluded from a valuable territory by some other Power, or to its Defence Council when this saw itself deprived of necessary raw materials. We accept as natural the risks of tension and conflict with another Power equally anxious about its prosperity and defence. An ideal solution—the recognition by responsible statesmen that they must agree to adjust their respective claims—used to hang suspended in our minds like Olympus watching the duels of Greek and Trojan. Bismarck's Germany had no use for these charming cloud-forms; the Third Reich has made an end of them. After 1933 the normal economic tensions were aggravated by the triumph in Germany of a nationalism divested of any rags of liberal thought or respect for the rule of law. The motives and intentions of Germany's new leaders in their struggle for power contained from the first elements it would be inadequate and silly to call economic. As inadequate as it was to interpret the Nazi triumph as a subtle conspiracy of German industrialists—'the death throes of monopoly capitalism', or whatever the

neo-Marxian formula was. Nazi Pan-Germanism, busy about rebuilding the Holy Roman Empire, desired power for the sake of power. Its economics are those of a barbarian leader in search of wealth. It wishes Lebensraum not only to make sure of unhindered access to raw materials and economic opportunities but to seize and portion among its own people the territory of defeated and dispossessed nations, as in Poland, and to impose forced labour on its subject races, as it is doing on the Poles and Czechs. The imprisonment, pillaging, and killing of Jews and political opponents in these countries, and in Germany and Austria, is a yet cruder form of the Nazi reversion to methods of conquest more familiar in the earlier history of Western Europe than—before 1933—they were to us. Totalitarian conquest is an old practice writ new, with the help of the aeroplane, the wireless, and the by no means new methods of the secret police. Its avowed object, the enrichment of the dominant ('Aryan') race, has not been achieved yet only because the French and English governments, having hoped vainly that each successive conquest, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, would gorge the monster, at last stiffened themselves to throw the bodies and wealth of their own subjects across its path. That they were driven to do this is as much a measure of their own past incompetence and lack of vision as of the medieval brutality of totalitarian ambitions.

Even now the Government talks of crushing Hitlerism as though, that done, we should have no more serious trouble in the world. Obedient literate apes support it in this and reprove an attempt to raise the wider issues. So do interested industrialists—interested only in reducing a formidable and unscrupulous rival. It cannot be said too often or too energetically that by itself military victory will settle nothing, except—for a time—the hopes of the Pan-Germans. If nothing comes of victory but a reshifting of the balance of power the war will have been fought in vain, as was the last war, and the most we can hope for is an interval of peace long enough to get the war memorials unveiled. Unless the principles of economic nationalism are reversed, unless nations resign their absolute power to disorder the living conditions of the whole world to their own temporary profit, we shall simply repeat, at a more despair-

ing level, the experience of 1919-1929, and of 1929-September 1939.

Socialists believe that national ownership and control of means of production would of itself remove the frictions that lead to war. Governments controlling their national industries, without the selfish pressure of 'monopoly capitalists', would make sensible arrangements with each other. It is possible. A discussion on the point would be profitable in Junior Common Rooms. The *conditions* for the emergence of a group of States preferring a liberal and democratic socialism do not exist now. It is difficult, except in the air of academic discussion, to conceive of any probable end to this war which would establish the necessary conditions. Apart from this, it needs an act of faith to rest comfortably in the belief that national Socialist States would be immune from the temptations to which all sovereign States, in absolute control of vast economic resources, are apt to give way. Even a sovereign State led by a Socialist Ministry, able to dispose of economic powers to the temporary benefit of its own industries, might deviate into nationalism. An impartial and even kindly survey of the present leaders of the Labour Party and the Trades Unions does not raise up visions of them working salvation in the midst of the earth ; it would be easier to make one's act of faith in the superior wisdom and address of a Socialist government if one had never listened to a Dalton or a Bevin. To transfer the ownership of industry to the State would remove, it is true, the pressure on the government of sectional groups of capitalists and Trades Unions clamouring for protection and exclusive privileges. But pressure now exerted by sectional interests could be openly and as insistently started up in the name of public interest. On what sure hope can we base a confidence that it would not be ? It is true that the Socialist parties adhering half-heartedly to the Second International make international professions, and true that the foreign policy of the Labour Party before 1931 was largely directed by liberal international principles, which could not be said of Henderson's successor. But so long as States have absolute powers of restriction and exclusion which can be used for the short-term enrichment or relief of the nation, so long is abuse of these powers possible and probable. And so

long will the common interest in peace of both rich and poor States be overlooked in the pressure on the one to defend its right to adopt any economic policy it likes and to keep its privileges in raw material areas, and on the other to attack it.

In the proper sense of the term, there is no economic organization in Europe; the international cartels set up to deal with certain basic raw materials have not been proof against sectional pressure. There are a number of independent States, whose economic arrangements are made and needs satisfied (or not) in a disorderly and grotesquely uneconomic fashion. Practices of restriction and exclusion which offer immediate gain to national industries are pursued without regard to their long-term effects, and a large part of the resources and energy of every nation are drawn off to defend its right to practise economic anarchy. In this condition of anarchy the very existence of a State is bound up with its ability to defend itself against other sovereign States pursuing the same policy. The defeat of this country by Germany would not lead straight to an economic reorganization of Europe on rational healthy lines. The defeat of Germany by the Allies in 1918 did not. The economic anarchy was allowed to persist until it ended in a conflict aggravated by the readiness with which the German nation tolerates and admires the Hero as Conqueror.

The choice between anarchy and some measure of federalism cannot wait. Whatever the internal politics of the chief European nations at the end of the war, they must either sacrifice as much of their sovereign independence as will allow them to establish the framework of an economic order, or perpetuate a Europe strangled by traffic barriers and crushed by the burden of defending its right to choke to death. If it were merely a question of slaughtering every twenty years an unstated number of men, women, children, our statesmen would doubtless resign themselves to the disagreeable necessity; they would either set up a Ministry of Cenotaphs or the Lord Privy Seal would get the job; and our religious leaders would accommodate themselves. But it has become a question of the survival of States, that is, of statesmen. If we do not organize Europe it will fall to pieces. The process, even for statesmen, will be damnably unpleasant.

It is possible to argue that the economic federation of Europe is impossible—that Europe is past praying for. It is not possible to argue that it is not desirable and not urgent. There is no palatable alternative. A German hegemony in Europe would impose on its subject races the order now existing in Czechoslovakia and turn Europe into a concentration camp. An Allied victory which does not establish international economic co-operation will settle nothing but the date of the next war. There must be an end to the present uneconomic and brutish disorder with its waste of life and wealth. The readiness with which people have seized on the ideas of federal union now current is a measure of our past hopelessness. The ideas are not new. The form given them by the English Society for Federal Union and in Streit's *Union Now*, and their eager acceptance in this crisis of Europe by people of all sorts, are new. Streit's book, and an excellent Penguin book, *The Case for Federal Union*, by W. B. Curry, provide the material on which people may form their own judgment. In my opinion it is rash to base any hopes on the willingness of America to enter into any form of federal union with the European democracies. If the chances of economic reorganization in Europe are bound up with America they are non-existent, and Europe is done for. It would be better to leave completely aside any notion of inducing the United States to co-operate in this form and at this stage. That co-operation in some form between a federated Europe and America could and would be established I have no doubt. But Europe ought, before inviting the participation of America, to cleanse herself of her disease of economic nationalism. The co-operation of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire is, on the other hand, essential; appeals addressed to the United States to support a policy of economic and social reconstruction would be better directed to them.

The first essential of peace and order in Europe is a limitation of sovereignty. States must be prepared to resign their powers to adopt financial and trade policies which, whatever temporary advantage they offer to the particular nation, are certain to end badly. International conferences and leagues or associations of independent States are useless without the machinery of economic co-operation. The power to control trade and

finance, to deal with other States and groups of States, to control and limit armaments, to enforce respect for international law, to control the use of raw materials, to govern and educate in colonial territories and to prepare them for self-government, to reconstruct and develop certain social services in Europe (*e.g.* communications, medicine), should be handled by a federal European Council, or Parliament—what does the name matter? With effective economic and social co-operation the political causes of friction between member States would be reduced to a minimum. But unless the nations of Europe are able to limit their sovereignty to the minimum degree necessary for the establishment of a central economic and financial authority, they are done for. We are done for. And serve us right. There is no room now in Europe for the destructive quarrels, economic and military, of gangs of armed States. (Valiant efforts to prove that England is not part of Europe and could remain profitably neutral have been silenced by the logic of events). There must be order and there must be economic co-operation. Without it, western democracy is at an end. There are some virtues in nationalism, but the nationalism which has strangled trade and movement in Europe, given their opportunity to a Hitler and a Himmler in a country somewhat prone to these diseases, robbed us of hope, and brought us to the edge of destruction, has outlived its uses. Unless we have determined to use it to destroy ourselves.

It will not be easy to replace uncontrolled State sovereignty by some form of economic and social federation, but nothing less is worth fighting for. Without the hope of such a new departure, the irony of this war following the war to end war would be unbearable. We have been brought to the edge of despair in the last few years. The maiming and slaughter of children and defenceless people in the streets and fields of their countries, the misery and humiliation of tens of thousands of exiles, the suicides, the foulness of concentration camps, the torturing of prisoners—these things have made our lives bitter, have made the spectacle of Europe a horror. The ideals of social justice, tolerance, freedom, are being ground to dust between the fragments of a disordered Europe. A mad and destructive nationalism has done this. Nothing matters but to get rid of it.

The League of Nations failed to achieve order in Europe because its most powerful member States were not willing to act with the self-restraint of civilized individuals. In fact they could not. Individuals have common interests. States, as sovereign bodies, have an immediate interest in preserving their power which overrides their interest in keeping the peace. Each member of the League did as it pleased and—as long as it was convenient—paid Geneva the civility of meeting there to discuss the resulting conflicts. The League's power to act as a living body resided only in its members. We were lately invited by our Government to lament the failure to function of a power it had consistently misused and neglected. The League never had an economic organization, nor means to create one. Its dusty state now does not alter the fact that one half of the machinery of international co-operation, and an invaluable knowledge and experience—it would be out of place to speak of the hopes of permanent officials and common men—is in existence, to be reconditioned and put to work. A generation has grown up which not only knows not Joseph but is bored by him. It is natural, but it is not a reason for talking about the League as though it were only fit to be forgotten. A recent writer in *The Times* pointed out that ' the League raises from all its European members an annual sum not much larger than that spent every year by the London County Council on main drainage '. In a federated Europe enough would be saved on armaments to provide a Reconstruction and Development Fund that would not be a mockery.

We must be prepared to achieve federal union in Europe by stages. A basis exists in the Oslo Group, and in the re-created mechanism for Franco-British co-operation. It is not utopian to make plans for the common economic and social organization of western Europe, including Norway, Sweden—and Germany. Germany cannot be left outside, and we ought to agree that we are fighting this war to compel her to come in. It cannot be ignored that there is a German problem distinct from the Nazi problem. That extraordinary German mysticism which poisons her with the idea of her ' higher right ' to conquer the world can only be cured by living in company with other nations. Germany must be held open, must be denied opportunity to shut herself

up and breed maggots. No matter what politicians who dislike having to think about the beastliness of concentration camps may say, the internal policy of Germany has become very much our concern. Her frontiers must be kept open to the passage of ideas, and freedom of speech and opinion demanded as part of the reparation she owes the rest of Europe. (It seems sometimes that the only thing to do with Germany after this war would be to insist on the children being educated abroad. I fear it is impracticable—but what a pity). For the sake of Europe, of which she is an integral part, we cannot allow Germany to go on corrupting herself with lies. No more than we can plan the organization of Europe—it is silly to speak of reorganizing what has never been organized—without her energy, her capacity for idealism, her decent virtues. Ruritanian plans to dismember Germany, put about by a few persons not notable for their political sagacity, will—if they are given enough publicity—stiffen German resistance. Is this what their authors want?

To say that the obstacles to inducing States to limit their sovereignty are too great is to say that we cannot save Europe. If the war were to end this week, some measure of federation would still be an instant practical necessity. This war, in effect a civil war, will decide the issue between civilization and anarchy.

It is not simply a question of peace terms to end this war, but of terms of peace for Europe. The peace terms themselves must provide the *conditions* for organization and reconstruction. It is unlikely that we shall be given another chance. Possibly we have not been given one this time. We must assume that we have.

W. H. DAVIES: THE MAN AND HIS WORK

By Richard Church

MR. W. H. DAVIES has just published another little book of poems, called *The Loneliest Mountain.** At the beginning he puts a note which says that "whatever happens, the present book ends my career as a living author." I recall, however, that he said much the same thing in 1910, when he published his fourth book of verse and called it *Farewell to Poesy*. He was forty years old then. He is sixty-nine to-day. There is thus less reason to doubt his present resignation.

But I do doubt it, for I know the man. I cannot say, as Mr. Shaw said in 1907 when he wrote his famous preface to Mr. Davies's *Autobiography of a Super-tramp*, a book which is now safely a classic, that "I hasten to protest at the outset that I have no personal knowledge of the incorrigible Super-tramp who wrote this amazing book." So what I have to say here is likely to be coloured by my admiration and affection for this remarkable man, and I had better explain at the beginning what I owe to him, so that for the moment I can forget it. To talk of one's affections is to dispel them, at least temporarily (as William Blake said), and that is what I want to do now so that I can write of his poetry without bias.

I first met that poetry in 1911, when I was lent a volume called *Nature Poems*. It happened at a moment in a youngster's life when he is very exalted by his youthful discoveries in the new field of literature. That is a period of magnificent intolerance. Only the best will do; Milton, Spenser, and the other immortals who have just begun to make the newcomer's acquaintance. So when I was offered poetry by a living man I felt a certain condescension.

How quickly that condescension was dispelled! I fell under

*Cape. 3s. 6d.

the spell of Mr. Davies's simplicity at once. I have remained under it ever since. But more of that later. I want first to speak of the man. I met him in 1918, a few months after my first book of verses had been published by his publisher, Fifield. It was a happy coincidence for me, because the publisher showed my book to Mr. Davies and in due course I received a postcard, written in a script that looked like a collection of blackthorn buds. It invited me to call and see him in his rooms near the British Museum. It explained that I must knock loudly with the knocker, because the bell was out of order and that owing to the war it could not be put right.

I followed these instructions, and thus began an acquaintance which developed into a friendship. And one cannot discuss friendships easily in public. I found a small but sturdy man, who because of the accident described in his autobiography, walked round the room with a hopping limp. His face was a warm brown, his suit was brown, and his eyes were large, shining, and still more brown. He was like a bird; a sparrow, a thrush, a nightingale; a touch of wildness, a brilliance of vision, a shyness, a voice rich and musical.

He gave me tea, and talked kindly about my first effort as an artist in verse-making. I listened to what he said, and some of it has stuck: especially one thing. It was this. "Never lose your enthusiasm." He then went on to speak of the brilliant beginners, with scholarship and much more at their command, whom he had seen degenerate into disillusioned literary men, bored by everything and especially by literature. He warned me not to become one of those. It sounded a simple enough axiom then. I have realized since how much wisdom lay behind it, and how difficult it is to live up to it. It has been a sort of lifeline to me, and it will be until I and my enthusiasm are removed elsewhere by Time, that greatest of all Enthusiasts.

I could tell a thousand and one stories which would throw light on this man and his character, both as friend and poet. They would all be benevolent ones, for I have never known him do a mean thing. Even in his animosities and shrewdness he has the quality of innocence; the quality which is the mainspring of his work. Of all the many writers whom I have met since—he was the first—I have met none in whom the man and

his work are so completely identified. Davies's poetry *is* Davies. The appearance, the colour, tone, movement, joy and fear of the man are exactly those found in the verse. This is an important matter for a critic to note. I suppose, from what evidence I can find from contemporary records, that Wordsworth was the same. It means that Davies is a *complete* poet; not a clever literary man. He is a unit; limited to himself; and that self is a singer. The knowledge and wisdom which he brings to the singing are restricted to his own experience. He explores it as completely as a sparrow explores a patch of a stable yard.

My first conception of the man was of a being endowed with an extraordinary kindness. It showed in his eloquent eyes, his whimsical smile which caused his strong mouth (the mouth of an old salt) to break into a smile so that his dry, shag-cured lips almost parted, but not quite. And from that not-quite a little bubbling sound of mirth, sheer delight, escaped. As I got to know the man better, I learned how much that delight signified; the generosity behind it.

It became a habit for me to go to tea with him once a week. I always found him waiting with an egg which he put on to boil as soon as I arrived. He said that I was too thin, and needed extra nourishment. A year or so later, when I called as usual, I found one day a visitor there. It was Roger Ingpen, then a publisher. The result of that meeting was my second book of verse. A long time after I learned from Roger Ingpen that if it had been necessary, Mr. Davies had offered to finance the volume from his very meagre income and Civil List pension. Events like that are epochs in one's life. The reader can understand why I want to put such things aside for a moment, while I try to assess the value of this body of poetry which Mr. Davies says has now come to an end. I still don't believe him. I know that as long as he lives, and can look out of a window, or stare into a fire, even if from the bed of a man crippled with age and infirmity, there will ensue some songs about light and warmth and all that they symbolize for this man gifted with an infinite genius for gratitude. He knows this too. He says, in his valedictory volume,

> How softly now my Days go by—
> How quietly the Moments glide!

Yet, underneath, I feel the rush
Of a swifter, stronger tide.

And though my Days glide softly by,
I ache from the throbs and fears
Of a terrible tide that, underneath,
Is carrying off my *Years*!

And I must quote another proof, if proof be needed.

Be damned, you cheeks, be damned and sink;
Body, bend double, sag and shrink;
Go dry, poor Skin, go thick and dry;
Sweet light, collect in neither eye;
Body, be damned—shall I not find
Your faults redeemed by my unfailing Mind?

A Mind that's strong enough to bear
A Dream-child every day of the year;
A Spirit full of young desire,
With growing pains, to reach up higher—
Is there no joy for men that think?
Body, be damned, bend double, sag and shrink!
Fools have their second childhood, but the Great
Still keep their first, and have no second state.

I have quoted that poem because it takes us much further in our estimate of this poet's lifework. You see that he says in these latter days what he said to me personally twenty-one years ago. This is an example of what I mean by the man and his work being in identity. In telling me to keep my enthusiasm he was expressing the same conviction as where he says, as a poet, that "the Great still keep their first childhood, and have no second state." For Mr. Davies, childhood is the symbol of enthusiasm, the immediate curiosity, the passion of interest, the complete absorption of self in the discovery of something. Davies the poet is a child still. He has a child's particularity which is yet such an oddly unscientific power, because it has no sense of relationship or classification. Davies the poet is still a child in his attitude to Nature because he never wants to codify it, or generalize into principles what he sees, hears and smells. Compare, for example, his knowledge of trees with that of Tennyson. One could almost make botanical drawings from Tennyson's references to trees and flowers. But with Davies you will find that his reference is usually to a few generalized types; the cherry tree, the plum tree, the oak. But I doubt if on his daily walks he will be able to, or care to, distinguish one from the other, except during the flowering season. It is the

same with the animals and birds whom he loves so much. He loves them too as a child loves them; with capital letters. Search his poems and you will find a thousand references to the robin, that 'feathered bully' the sparrow, or to the nightingale with "the moon's white beams across her throat". But that will be about all the natural history in which Mr. Davies cares to indulge. It is an astonishing thing how a poet, so genuinely enraptured with beast, bird and plant, can go all his life singing about them, yet never be curious to know their variations, their specific habits and qualities. The poetaster, with woolly mind, might remain thus addicted to generalizations, but nobody would read his verse. We read Mr. Davies, however, and we recognize true poetry, that strange and exciting power, in his lyrics with their eighteenth century habit of apostrophizing things and labelling them with capital letters. As he says to-day,

> I have no ears or eyes
> For either bird or flower,

but even so he conjures a world of minute and factual happenings down to the reader's hand; and a shy, elusive world it is too. His lyrics give us the same feeling, that sort of skin-caress delight, which we experience when we persuade a robin to come and feed from our hand, or when—as happened once to him—a butterfly alights on the pencil with which we are writing.

It is therefore absurd to call Davies a nature poet. Nature poets, with their meticulous catalogues—such as John Clare gives us—can be bores. Davies, with his handful of references which he repeats again and again, is never a bore. On the contrary, he puts a sort of enchantment upon us, just as a thrush does when we hear it in autumn prophesying of next year's spring. The emotion is a kind of nostalgia, a harkening back to the morning of life, of time, the lost realm of innocence, where everything is wonder, and nothing is knowledge.

How then does he manage to do this? We see how limited he is in *what* he says. A technical examination of his verse further reveals how limited he is in *how* he says it. His devices have all been used before by the Caroline minor poets, and by the fanciful verse-makers of the eighteenth century. Yet Davies can be as playful and fanciful as he likes, and he catches our hearts.

My Fancy loves to play with Clouds
That hour by hour can change Heaven's face;
For I am sure of my delight,
In green or stony place.

You see the vagueness of it, and the Augustan habit of those capital letters. But you will also see in that verse—an early one taken from his first selected volume of poems—the explanation of his power over the reader. "For I am sure of my delight in green or stony place" is an absolute truth which defines the man and the poet. It identifies them too, so that the two become one, and remain one throughout the long life of this remarkable personality. Even in misery, pain, and rage, Davies is sure of his delight. He distils that aromatic drop of song from his surroundings, though he may be sitting in the hold of a sailing ship, tending sea-sick cattle; or lying in a Canadian hospital, in the casual ward, after his foot has been cut off by a locomotive.

I spoke of rage. That brings us to another side of this poet. It is a side which has also found expression in a simple prose that earned the praise of Shaw, who said of the *Autobiography of a Supertramp*, that "this book, which is printed as it was written, without any academic corrections from the point of view of the Perfect Commercial Letter Writer, is worth reading by literary experts for its style alone." It is worth reading because it burns with rage, a fine, clear rage as lucid as his delight, as free as his joy. But here again the emotion is not detailed, is not worked up into a political or social principle. A few tramps, a few hungry old beggar women, a cheated prostitute, a brutally used child, a tortured animal; these are the material with which Davies feeds his divine rage, and which are sufficient to make him realize that what he sees here on earth merits some thought about an afterworld, a presiding God, and a personal soul within himself. It is significant that his first book, published from a Walworth doss-house, was called *The Soul's Destroyer*. Since then he has never ceased to sing, between his moods of sheer delight in momentary lovely things, of the fatal cruelty of man, of beast and bird, of the waves of the sea, which with a blind indifference pursue a destiny of destruction that Mr. Davies is not scientist enough to pretend to understand or

explain, but which he can expose in songs as excoriating and horrifying as the events they portray.

> I saw that woman go from place
> To place, hungry for her child's face;
> I heard her crying, crying, crying;
> Then, in a flash! saw the Sea trying
> With savage joy, and efforts wild,
> To smash his rocks with a dead child.

But in this outcry of pain there is the same detachment as in his delight. It is the detachment of the child, the bewilderment that is also an ecstasy, the fear that is also enthusiasm. Yes, enthusiasm. And that is where we started from. But that is where we always come to with this man's work. It forms a complete sphere, a little world of its own. That is why it is likely to take its place in the cosmos of English poetry, a permanent planet.

THE BALTIC UPHEAVAL

By Robert Machray

OBVIOUSLY, definitely, the clock has been put back in the Baltic. and twenty years of history are undone. This is certainly not the least remarkable among the great political changes which have taken place in Europe during 1939, a year of destiny if ever there was one. Of its astounding events the upheaval in the Baltic is in its way perhaps the most surprising, because all forecasts, apparently quite soundly based, suggested a different development not only as possible but practically inevitable. In this case the unexpected happened; in other cases expectation was realized. The tragic Munich Agreement of Mr. Chamberlain with Herr Hitler, the source of so many evils, led most observers, outside British Government circles, to foretell the destruction of Czechoslovakia and even of Poland by Germany; and those sad prophecies have been fulfilled. The shadow of Munich likewise fell and lay dark and heavy on the Baltic. Fear of Hitler's expansionist aims filled the hearts of all the small nations that lived along its shores, especially the Baltic States, commonly so called —Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, for, as all could see, the threat to them was direct and manifest.

German pressure on Lithuania and local Nazi activities in Memel in the closing weeks of 1938 seemed to indicate plainly enough where the start would be made. This apprehension was amply justified when in the early spring of last year Hitler seized Memel and like a conqueror issued orders to the Lithuanian Government which had perforce to accept them. For all the world it looked as if the stage was set for a great German drive up the Eastern Baltic, with Hitler's dominance assured throughout that area. But the drive did not come off according to plan; it did not come off at all, and not Hitler but Stalin holds those States in his hands to-day. He got them so

easily that general interest in their fate, which was keen at the outset, waned appreciably until the brave resistance of the Finns to the Soviet's invasion of their country, and the deepening concern of Scandinavia, called universal attention to the Baltic again.

The high points of the story were all in 1939. Of what had gone before I gave an account exactly a year ago in the FORTNIGHTLY in an article entitled "Baltic Trends." It took the line, unavoidable as things were, that though the Baltic States had proclaimed their neutrality Hitler was about to make himself their master. The Soviet scarcely came then into the picture. But among the movements toward the end of the year was a proposal by Finland and Sweden to refortify the Aland Islands; it was brought before the League of Nations early in 1939 and bitterly opposed by the Soviet's representative, who characterized Finland as pro-German. The next Baltic event of importance was a pendant to Hitler's rape of Czechoslovakia in the shape of his seizure of Memel, already referred to. More significant still, even from the Baltic point of view, were the demands he proceeded to make on Poland. It is true that she possessed only a small part of the Baltic littoral, but for years she had maintained a policy of collaboration and good neighbourliness that was in the nature of an understanding with the little Baltic States, whose political freedom and territorial integrity she all along stoutly championed. It seemed as if Europe was falling in pieces, and it is at this point that the interest of the story quickens.

The British Government, with an effect of extraordinary abruptness, executed a complete *volte face* as regards foreign policy. On March 31 Mr. Chamberlain informed the House of Commons that the Government, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government considered it vital to resist, would feel bound at once to lend that Government "all support in its power." He added that the French Government authorized him to state that it took a precisely similar attitude to Poland. Colonel Beck, then Polish Foreign Minister, came to London, and on April 6 it was announced that Britain and Poland would enter into a permanent agreement—an alliance, in fact; but as

the " Agreement for Mutual Assistance ", as the instrument was termed, was not signed till August 25 the considerable period of five months which intervened between Chamberlain's categorical statement and the signature of the treaty was regarded in some quarters as significant of a certain indecision on the part of the British Government, and was held to throw doubt on its good faith.

Meanwhile Hitler had denounced the Polish-German Treaty of 1934 and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. His speeches at that time—April—made it clear that he had no truck and was not going to have any truck with what he then styled the " Bolshevik Russia of Stalin." In England and elsewhere in less degree there was much talk of the formation of a Peace Front which the Soviet might join, to say nothing of its assisting Poland with its forces or at least of securing her against attack from the rear in the event of a German war. Yet as early in this story as May 3 the resignation of M. Litvinoff of the post of Soviet Foreign Commissar which he had held for several years might have notified the world that Stalin had in view some important fresh departure in his policy. The appointment of M. Molotoff as Litvinoff's successor should have given point to that idea. It was not appreciated in England.

Anyhow, in May-June British delegates went to Moscow with the object of getting Stalin to bring Russia into the Peace Front, but after a beguiling welcome they presently discovered that the atmosphere had become a little chilly, particularly, it was alleged, as they were not the sort of high officials Stalin had expected to greet. It was said that Lord Halifax himself had been invited in mid-June to the Kremlin, and had turned the invitation down. It may be recalled that the efforts of the British Government to induce Stalin to collaborate in the Peace Front were considered by Germany as part and parcel of the " encirclement " policy. In mid-June, as it happened, Lord Halifax in a letter to the British Ambassador at Berlin wrote of a conversation he had just had with the German Ambassador in London in the course of which that diplomat said that much of the anti-British feeling prevalent in Germany was due to all the discussion going on about the " British anti-aggression negotiations with Russia." Germany resented

the regrouping of the Powers Britain was organizing as it " was designed to operate as coercive pressure upon her." Lord Halifax, of course, replied by saying that " if anybody was encircling Germany it was herself by the policy she persisted in pursuing."

Readers of our newspapers, virtually our only tolerably full sources of information respecting the Moscow negotiations cannot fail to remember how uncertain and twisting they were, endued with what hopes and fears, what " ups and downs, mostly downs ! " On May 25 Mr. Chamberlain stated that if all went well a British-French-Soviet defence agreement would soon be concluded ; the inference to be drawn was that things were going well ; and a final draft of the British proposals was dispatched to Moscow. But Molotoff quickly repudiated such optimism ; admitting that England and France had taken a " step forward ", he yet declared that on the question of guarantees to Central and East European States no progress had been achieved at all. He said that the proposals did not provide for assistance to be given by Britain and France to the Powers on the north-west frontiers of the Soviet, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, who might be unable to defend their neutrality against aggression. As Lithuania did not border on the Soviet it did not come into Molotoff's purview. He went on to say that unless guarantees were given to these States the Soviet could not assume obligations toward the five Powers which England and France had already guaranteed. Here was a serious difficulty, and, as it proved to the end unsurmountable.

Now we come to specific Baltic questions again. During May Germany was by no means idle ; she busied herself with Danzig and Poland, and to counteract the Moscow negotiations she offered non-aggression pacts to most of the Baltic countries—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Norway and Denmark ; first Denmark, and then Estonia and Latvia accepted and signed such a treaty. It is impossible to suppose that at that moment there could be collusion between Hitler and Stalin; the Baltic States were in no sort of position to bring those two Great Powers together for or against them, but, as it turned out, they later involuntarily helped, it may be said, to do just that as part of the price paid by Hitler to the Soviet. Stalin, by his

mouthpiece Molotoff, would not then yield. The three Baltic States to be guaranteed or none—so said Molotoff inflexibly. In England there was a good deal of reluctance about guaranteeing the three States, and all the more because they did not want any guarantee, but kept on proclaiming their neutrality and their independence. For them to identify themselves with the Peace Front was to antagonize Germany—as late as Midsummer last year it was Germany and not the Soviet that remained their principal preoccupation ; it was still Hitler that was the menace to their independence, so dear to their hearts.

No one who had visited them and got to know the depth of that feeling of theirs could be surprised that they declared they would fight for their neutrality, for their independence went with it. To hear them talk of it was very moving. The sentiment of these States found magnificent expression in Riga, the Latvian capital, in a tall, slender, graceful and beautiful obelisk called the Monument of Liberty. " This monument was built," says Riga in its municipal records, " to express the joy and pride of the Latvian people at winning back freedom and independence after centuries of bondage and oppression." Alas, how ironic all that sounds to-day !

July passed into August and still those British-French negotiations with the Soviet continued in Moscow—without result. In the meantime Hitler and Stalin had secretly come to terms for the overrunning and dismemberment of Poland—and much else as was evident afterwards. A treaty of non-aggression was signed at Moscow on August 23 by Molotoff and Ribbentrop. Commenting on it next day in the Commons Mr. Chamberlain said he would not attempt to conceal from the House that the announcement of this pact came as a most unpleasant surprise to the Government. Farther on in his speech he remarked that the announcement was hailed in Berlin, with extraordinary cynicism, as a great diplomatic victory which removed any danger of war, since " we (the British) and France would no longer be likely to fulfil our obligations to Poland." He added, " we felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion." He did not refer to the Baltic, but how its small States must have been wondering what effect the Hitler-Stalin deal was to have on them ; they were not left

in doubt very long. Its effect was seen at once in Poland in a German invasion of that country on September 1 from the west and a Soviet invasion from the east on September 17, followed swiftly by the destruction of that unfortunate land and the enslavement of its people.

Poland had been a great State of thirty-five millions and was now fallen down in bloody ruin in four weeks before the German and Soviet dictators in alliance ! She had been a support and a friend to the Baltic States, and now she was gone, her name erased from the map, her Allies, England and France, powerless to prevent her obliteration. It was soon known that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland had been summoned to appear in the person of their Foreign or other Ministers at Moscow for the purpose of entering into treaties of " mutual assistance " with the Soviet, the mutual assistance being entirely derisory so far as the small States were concerned. By agreement with Hitler, Stalin was in effect about to pronounce sentence on them. Estonia came up first, then Latvia, and Lithuania next. Let us consider, very briefly, the political and economic situation of the three States at that time. They had been independent for twenty years ; they had not been given but had achieved their freedom after bitter fighting against both Bolsheviks and Germans in 1919-20. They emerged as democratic republics, and the Soviet made peace with them in 1920.

Their leaders were Konstantin Paets, Estonia ; Karlis Ulmanis, Latvia ; and Antanas Smetona, Lithuania. By a singular coincidence of history these men are their leaders to-day, though changes took place during the intervening years in the leadership and in the political status of the republics. Internal as well as external strains and stresses led to a semi-Fascist government being adopted some years ago by all three States ; Estonia struggled back under Paets to a parliamentary system in 1937 ; Latvia and Lithuania were still semi-Fascist in September, 1939. But unquestionably all three were enjoying an orderly and peaceful existence, unvexed by political disputes of a serious kind, and their fear of disturbance came, as already said, not from inside but from outside. They had small armies, proportionate to the size of each State, but of little account against a Great Power—insufficient, in fact, to defend and

maintain their neutrality. From the economic point of view all three States were modestly prosperous ; they had successfully developed their industries, chiefly agricultural, and the balance of trade was favourable ; they exported large quantities of bacon, butter, eggs and farm produce to England, as well as other commodities ; Germany was their biggest customer, but they tried hard to hold and increase the British traditional interest in the Baltic. I remember very well one of their statesmen telling me in Riga in 1934 how delighted they would be if England would adopt them as members of the Empire.

For their protection and for mutual benefit they had formed themselves into the Baltic Entente, on the model of the other Ententes of our time. But it did not serve them in their visit to Moscow. Overwhelmed and stunned by the dark fate of Poland at the hands of Hitler and Stalin, they thought it would be suicidal to oppose the Soviet ; they capitulated and surrendered their independence on terms that left their vassalized States still in being with a certain life of their own. On September 29 Estonia signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet which placed her politically in the latter's power by permitting the occupation within her territory of specific ports and districts as Soviet naval and air bases. Next, treaties of the same sort were signed by Latvia and Lithuania with Moscow. Before the War of 1914-18 Tsarist Russia had a great war-harbour at Libau, renamed Liepaja by Latvia, whose resources were of course inadequate to keep it up, and it will probably now become a great Russian port again, whether for peace or war. It is ice-free all the year round and in it the Russians realize once more their old Baltic dream of a " warm-water " outlet to the sea. More to mortify the Poles than please the Lithuanians the vassalization of the latter's country has been soothed somewhat by the Soviet's rendition to it of Vilna, though whether that city contained much above two per cent. that was genuinely Lithuanian is doubtful. Nor is it likely that Vilna will replace Kaunas (Kovno) as capital of Lithuania ; as matters stand Kaunas is the better and far livelier town.

In due course Soviet troops took over and garrisoned the ports and proposed air bases, but what must have been the

feelings of Paets, Ulmanis, Smetona and patriots like them at that desecration of their freedom? Apparently, however, the bulk of the population is settling down, resolved to make the best of the situation, but it is scarcely possible to suppose that Sovietization is very remote. One other feature of the Hitler-Stalin compact respecting the three States which has not so far been mentioned in this article was the repatriation of their German elements—the "Balts"—to Germany, which in this instance meant parts of the western provinces of Poland annexed as the result of her collapse and disintegration in September. In the great majority of cases the three States saw the Balts depart without shedding many tears over them. A notable fact was that whereas Nazis like Rosenberg had claimed in their propaganda that the Eastern Baltic was German because most by far of its people were German, the actual number of those repatriated amounted to only a small percentage of the population; a further number of Balts declined to move from their old homes, but were not really numerous. The order for repatriation came from Berlin in a very peremptory manner, and allowed little time for the "evacuees" to prepare for their departure. A special correspondent of *The Times*, in a message from Riga dated October 15, explained this precipitate haste as caused by Hitler's extreme need to obtain from Stalin the gold for the sale of Germany's Baltic interests that had been part of their bargain. What was evident "beyond peradventure" was Stalin's determination to dominate the Eastern Baltic; he succeeded with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania without any trouble, but not so with Finland.

At this writing it is not certain that the Soviet is going to subjugate the Finns, though with the odds so heavy against them —170 millions to about four millions—they are hardly likely to do more than put up a very good fight, which, however, if it continues for an appreciable length of time, may play havoc with the Hitler-Stalin plans—and not only for the Baltic. The wonderful stand Finland is making is already an epic of the Northlands that echoes all round the world. When Stalin summoned her representative to Moscow in the second week of October she had before her eyes what had happened to Estonia and the other Baltic States, knew what to expect, and was

determined not to yield up her freedom, but short of it to be as conciliatory as was possible. The Soviet proposals for "improving relations," as Molotoff phrased it, but which would have made Finland another Bolshevik vassal, travelled back and forth between Moscow and Helsinki three times during the rest of October; the Finns made important concessions, but insufficient to satisfy Stalin, whose aggressive spirit was unmistakably plain. The Kings of Sweden, Norway and Denmark—the Scandinavian group—conferred with Kallio, the Finnish President, at Stockholm, expressed their sympathy for the Finns, and reaffirmed their neutrality. From America and all the ends of the earth came warm messages of sympathy and strong denunciations of Soviet aggression.

In November the Soviet, undeterred, increased its demands, but Finland stood firm; a deadlock ensued, and her Moscow Mission again went home, though the negotiations were declared to be suspended, not broken off, The Soviet then began a fierce and unscrupulous propaganda campaign against Finland on the familiar Nazi model; indeed all through those weeks of strain it was that model that was followed—and rather bettered—by the Soviet Press. A manufactured incident on the frontier by the Soviet forced the tension higher but in the west war, it was thought, would not break out. On November 27 Finland definitely rejected Stalin's terms; three days later President Roosevelt offered to mediate, but on the morning of that day the Soviet, without a declaration of war, began hostilities by bombing Helsinki and other Finnish centres from the air, and by marching across the frontier above and below Lake Ladoga. Everywhere, except in Germany but not universally there, the attack was condemned as an act of absolutely unprovoked aggression—without the shadow of any excuse. Even British liberals and other Leftist elements who had cherished somehow or other fond hopes of Soviet Russia and her "idealism" abandoned their illusions and spoke of "aggressive Bolshevik Imperialism." "Where now," asked the shocked *News Chronicle*, "is the idealism and the faith in the creation of a better world which on every anniversary of the November Revolution drew to the Red Square thousands of men and women from every corner of the earth in celebration?" On

the twenty-second anniversary the Soviet was attacking the Finns, but not making much of a job of it—thanks to the courage, determination and tenacity of the defence.

In trying to estimate what the upheaval in the Baltic portends this definite, unequivocal unmasking of Stalin and Soviet policy, which I have purposely narrated in some detail, seems to me much the most important factor. We know now where we are with Moscow just as with Berlin ; Hitler and Stalin stand together as the super-gangsters of this age, and we have to face the grim fact that they are allies, not rivals, at present, whatever may be said to the contrary or the future may disclose. It is no wonder that Sweden and Norway are deeply anxious, the one for her iron ores, the other for her fiords on the North Sea, so readily available for German and/or Soviet submarines. But predatory desires like wishful thinking can leap and extend far beyond the Baltic ; if Stalin wants Finnish nickel mines and takes them, why may not Hitler do the same with Rumanian oil, the one brigand the complement of the other ? As Lord Halifax, on December 5, after remarking that Hitler to gain a free hand in Poland had bartered what was not his to barter, namely, the liberty of the Baltic peoples, said " The sequence of events showed how wide was the damage once the floodgates were open." The floodgates remain wide open. We in England have to make up our minds to a possible grave and incalculable extension of the war, and govern ourselves accordingly.

EBB AND FLOW

By Stephen Gwynn

THERE is little use in adding to the general chorus of execration which has redoubled its energy since the Russians made their onslaught on Finland. Yet the news from there, ravage and disgusting though the details are, does not rouse such fierce reactions as what comes through from the tortured and ravaged peoples of Poland and of Czechoslovakia. And we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is in Germany no element that will raise effective protest against such barbarities of repression; for deep seated in the German mind is a belief that ruthless brutality is a mark of the virile. They can be proud of it. How this consists with their other qualities, might well puzzle psychologists: for, as I have known from experience that touched me more nearly than if I had been the sufferer, a stranger, struck down with deadly illness among Germans, will meet with more helpful kindness and truer sympathy than one could count on in England or in France. Yet—setting aside the question of what may be counted as legitimate in actual war—there is the belief in Germany that power has the right to use inhuman methods to enforce its will, and even an admiration for ruthlessness in acting on that belief. There is in every country—England is no exception—an element which shares this frame of mind and is infuriated above all things by the resistance of the weak. But there is also in free countries, and perhaps above all in England, an element which will make its voice heard and obeyed. That is why the Irish struggle of twenty years ago ended as it did. Facts that were not publicly avowed began to be known and men like Lord Grey of Fallodon spoke out. In Germany there is no equivalent for such men; nor has there been at any time. It cannot be fear that keeps all German voices silent, if there are voices insistent to be heard,

The German Character

for Germans, as every day shows us, will meet death as valiantly as any race. The lack of this restraining element on armed power is the thing which makes German pre-eminence a danger to Europe; and the presence of it is what entitles England to take the lead on behalf of civilization—or rather, to share it with France.

* * * * *

Leadership's Toll

Such leadership is the costliest privilege in blood and treasure that the world has ever seen. America is resolute not to have any share in so burdensome an honour—which indeed may end in financial prostration. Yet if Germany has recovered after the utmost exhaustion and defeat, France and England may well hope to do as much after victory. To a certain extent their task has been shared by the Low Countries, which at least have made ready to defend themselves; it seems certain that Belgium made it clear that if Holland were attacked, Belgium would not remain neutral—knowing well that its territory would be the next to be violated. The Scandinavian countries, perhaps wisely, have determined—so far at least—to wait while aggressive war rages on their borders; wisely, for we are here in the region of the unknown. Poland, of all European countries except Belgium the least protected by nature, was rapidly overrun—though not without great cost—even before the appearance of a second invading host ended a resistance thus taken in the rear. But Poland offered many military objectives in its great centres of population; weather helped mechanized operations, and everywhere the air force had an easy field. In a land of few cities, where lake, and forest cover a vast proportion of the surface, neither tanks nor aeroplanes can have the same efficiency; and in desultory warfare the very sparseness of population is an advantage to the defence. Russia may well have embarked on a very long drawn out war against resolute riflemen, who will not lack the support at least of hundreds of volunteers from across their border.

But whatever happens, the Baltic will no longer be a German lake. Sweden will need to conserve all her forces to resist interference with what remains of her right to free navigation. It is possible however that Russia may in time raise objection

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to the blocking by German mines of channels which Russian shipping may desire to use. There are many reasons why the restriction of *Lebensraum* which have resulted from Herr von Ribbentrop's famous compact must be singularly unpleasing to German military men. They must see the prospect—after they have crushed France and England—of another and not a smaller war staring them in the face.

* * * * *

A Contrast

It is curious to contrast the present situation with that of, say, 1917. Then, the neutral countries in Europe could be counted almost on the fingers of one hand: and outside Europe, war, the same war, was in a score of regions. Now, the greater part of Europe looks on with anxiety while two duels are in progress: one of gigantic Russia against a small but elusive and determined opponent: the other, that in which France and England are pitted against the monstrous might which France and England, in honest horror of war, permitted Germany to build up. One must notice how widespread the conviction has become that war cannot be profitable. Even the Balkan countries, most belligerent of European states, appear inclined to pursue peace by methods of reason, however great the difficulties which that pursuit may encounter—difficulties which are the legacy of several wars. But Italy, which led the way in preaching through every village school the cult of arms, now leads in peace-making—much assisted by the growing fear of Russian intervention and the growing willingness to resist Germany's imperious demands. The Duce does not, at least publicly, put forward embarrassing claims. He probably feels that he can wait till in an exhausted Europe his terms may be difficult to reject.

At all events we may be thankful for any limitation of the field of combat: though so far as naval warfare is concerned, it is ocean-wide: and whether on sea or land, the allied forces of freedom are engaged against the most formidable thing known to humanity—a drilled and disciplined fanaticism. Nothing can resist that but a faith that is unshakeable, and a will to victory no less resolute than the fanatic's. Fortunately, by land and by sea, there is evidence enough that it exists in Great Britain; by land, in the general bearing of the people; by sea,

nowhere more conspicuously than in the rush of fishermen all along the coast to man mine sweepers when a new menace was formidably developed. And to crown this unenlisted voluntary heroism—not undisciplined, for the seaman's life is a discipline—there was the 'Rawalpindi's' magnificent defiance, wasteful of everything, except the one thing which mattered before all and above all—the thing which can beat and will beat fanaticism—the maintenance of a superb tradition, built up through centuries of freedom. And the same was true of the 'Exeter', 'Achilles' and 'Ajax' off the South American coast.

* * * * *

Chivalry Returns

This war in its present shape is no longer the confused indecipherable welter that raged by Ypres and along the Somme; indeed we seem almost back in the days of chivalry when the mounted knight was sent out to do his deeds by individual prowess. He does them now often almost out of eyesight's reach, engaged in duels miles aloft; not always, perhaps not often, actually single-handed, as in the air fights of twenty years ago; it is like the combats of the heroic chariot fighters, each with his charioteer. What we read of now may be, probably are, like the preluding encounters in ancient wars between picked champions before the general *mêlée*. That may come, probably must come; it will not find either England or France unprepared, nor a temper neither less fine than those opening encounters have shown. And if we are not misled by all the reports, it is proved already that equipment on the allied side is not equal but superior to what it has to meet.

One thing perhaps should be noted. Captains of German merchant vessels, ordered by British warships to heave to, obey a general order and scuttle their craft, trusting in the tradition which ordains that they shall be rescued by the ship which they cheat of a prize. It has been suggested in letters to the press that this tradition should be set aside, and that such voluntary castaways should be left at the mercy of wind and waves—like so many crews and passengers suddenly mined or torpedoed far out at sea. In this way it is held that losses might be in future avoided, since the risk would not be taken if such penal consequences were foreknown. It seems that advocates of such

a course do not realize what would be lost ; a prestige of civilization worth more than many thousand tons of shipping ; and in the last resort, worth more as aid to victory. If a British ship acted in so German a fashion, there would be swift loss of the sympathy which to-day gathers on the side of England even in countries where—as in the case of the United States—England is not traditionally popular. In short, England cannot afford to fall below her own standard of honour—least of all, on her own element, the sea. Not even to catch the 'Bremen'.

* * * * *

Italy's Attitude

A problem which begins to force itself on notice is the attitude of Italy. While Russian methods and German develop every day fresh resemblances, Mussolini appears determined to make it clear that Fascism as understood in Italy is no relation of Bolshevism. There has been no mistaking Italy's resentment of the murder of Poland ; and about Finland (where the Axis is not involved) angry demonstrations have taken place. It is reported that Italian aeroplanes are being supplied to the Finns. But the real anxiety for Italian statesmen concerns the Balkans, and the threatening language now held towards Rumania by a Russian press which certainly does not say anything disapproved by Stalin. None of the Balkan States—not even Bulgaria which is credited with some sentimental attachment to Russia—can wish to see Red armies on their own soil ; and even to see them on a neighbour's territory—however much they may dislike that neighbour—would be far from reassuring. What Italy can do, if she takes a risk, proof will be needed to show ; but it seems certain that if Germany or Russia are proved to be acting together in the Balkans, as they have acted around the Baltic, there will be an end of the Axis—which even to-day shows evidence of nearing breaking point.

* * * * *

In Stalin's Region

What the play of forces may be in Stalin's environment, no ordinary European can guess. Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Hess, von Brauchwitz and the rest are not unknown quantities ; we have every chance to be familiar with their individual utterances, and even with their voices ; and much of what we hear recalls the savage

phrases with which Tacitus branded the surrounders of Otho and Vitellius. But over Russia a veil hangs, behind which looms up this one heavy enigmatic figure—menacing all Europe ; yet clearly, above all menacing his German ally. The proclamations which go out to-day addressed to Finland will most assuredly, when the time comes, be addressed to the tillers of the soil and the factory hands in Germany—and most of all in Prussia. They may well find a very different response to that which they met in Finland. But the hour to make them will not be till nerves in Germany have been worn by fierce encounters and by steadily increasing privations. Then there may be a great killing, and Europe will be lucky if what perishes is the worst in Hitler's Germany and not the best.

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UNCOMMON SENSE

By Wickham Steed

THE 20 YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. By Professor E. H. Carr. *Macmillan.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

A WORLD TO MAKE, by J. Daniel Chamier. *Arnold.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

These two books were written and set up in type before the war broke out. The authors of both preferred to leave them unchanged. In this they have been wise; for except at one or two points, and where terms like "pre-war" or "post-war" refer to the war of 1914-1918, not to the present war, the books do not "date". They are full of common sense in an uncommon degree.

Much learning has not obscured the clearness of Professor Carr's thought which is always working to distinguish between appearance and reality and to call things by their names. Of his many good chapters I like best his discerning essay on "Morality in International Politics". If he does not keep the balance quite even between "realists"—who hold that relations between States are governed solely by power, and that morality plays no part in them—and the "Utopians"—who aver that the same code of morality is applicable to States and to individuals—he gives the devil (or the "realist") his due, and lets the "Utopians" feel the keen edge of criticism. Yet he recognizes as a matter of common sense that "some recognition of an obligation to our fellow-men, as such, seems implicit in our conception of civilization"; and he adds: "One reason why a higher standard of morality is not expected of States is because States in fact frequently fail to behave morally and because there are no means of compelling them to do so". Whether or not there is such a thing as an International Community, Professor Carr thinks "there is a world community for the reason (and for no other) that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community. There is a world community because, as Señor de Madariaga puts it, 'We have smuggled that truth into our store of spiritual thinking without preliminary discussion'."

The main problem to-day is how to harness this sense of a world community to some practical arrangement, or the beginnings of it, in such fashion as to transform our "spiritual thinking" into political action. Professor Carr puts the thing in a nutshell when he writes: "There is no escape from the fundamental dilemma that every community, and every code of morality, postulates some recognition that the

good of the part may have to be sacrificed to the good of the whole. The more explicitly we face this issue in the international community, the nearer we shall be to a solution of our problem."

Here Professor Carr links up unexpectedly with Mr. Chamier's *A World To Make.* Though Mr. Chamier's "world" is chiefly England he puts his case tersely in one short paragraph: "Life was once a hasty journey through a vale of tears; now that it is a residence we naturally want to make it as comfortable as possible". And his idea of "comfort" includes spiritual comfort. How uncomfortable as a "residence" the present world is for many people in this country he shows in his chapter "Bread and Circuses" which awakens memories of the 19th century social reformers, and particularly of Charles Kingsley's "Alton Locke". But it is the level-headed sanity of his outlook and of his criticism that is most striking and most refreshing. I confess that I opened his book distrustfully. His biography of the ex-Kaiser, published some years ago under the title *Fabulous Monster*, struck me at the time as a piece of special pleading not always respectful of known facts. But I went through the pages of this book rejoicing, and vowed to read them again as soon as a benign fate should grant me a little leisure.

Nowhere is Mr. Chamier saner than when he says: "The salvation of Parliamentary Government must lie in its not being a farce". This sentence was obviously written before the outbreak of war last September. Then the Deputy-Leader of the Labour Opposition was adjured from Ministerial benches to "speak for England"—and did so. Whatever strength Communism may possess or acquire, Mr. Chamier believes, is derived from real grievances and sufferings, and signifies "that a part of the nation, with a fierce fanatical sincerity, rejects our celebrated Parliamentary Government as a farce". Since he wrote, Communism has gained no ground. Many who spoke contemptuously of Parliament as a "talking shop" have come to feel that to have a talking shop is at once a safeguard and a privilege—indeed, a condition of political freedom.

I like this book. And I hope that others who may read it will like it, too.

PARLIAMENT, by W. Ivor Jennings. *Cambridge University Press.* 25*s.*

It is a fact of high significance that the Opposition parties should have declined, on the outbreak of the present war, to share the responsibilities of the Executive Government. They have preferred to retain the rights and exercise the proper function of an Opposition in the Legislation Body. Their decision adds further testimony to the strengthening conviction—manifested in many different quarters—that Parliament has still an important part to play in the control of public policy, in the administration of affairs.

Hardly had I finished the preceding paragraph when THE FORTNIGHTLY for December reached me and I read at the outset of Mr. Stephen Gwynn's *Ebb and Flow* as follows: "The House of Commons is something very far from a mere registering machine. It has forced the Government to tackle resolutely some of the more intolerable consequences of defects in foresight which were to be expected in such an

upheaval. . . . On the whole Parliament is doing its job in a way that must give satisfaction to all who have at any time belonged to the House of Commons . . ."

Most cordially I welcome this confirmation from an old colleague of the impression made upon my own mind by recent events. And testimony to the same effect reaches me from other quarters.

All this adds topical interest to the imposing volume just published by Dr. Jennings. Some three years ago he published a very able study on *Cabinet Government*. That the present volume should be as attractive to the student of politics as its predecessor is not to be expected. In *Cabinet Government* Dr. Jennings was on almost virgin soil. The ground covered by the Legislative side of Government has on the contrary been assiduously cultivated. That is quite natural: Parliament is not only a much older body than the Cabinet; it is the parent body. We used to be taught that we must look to the Privy Council for the parentage of the Cabinet. But that is only a half truth. The Cabinet has sprung from the loins of Parliament, of which it is, in effect, the Executive Committee.

Well-trodden as is the ground covered by Dr. Jennings in the present volume he has treated an old theme with remarkable freshness and originality. He has given us not the stereotyped *history* of the evolution of Parliament, but an analysis of its actual functions and procedure. Nor is it a bare analysis. With amazing industry Dr. Jennings has assembled numberless illustrations of the points he sets out to emphasize. He is concerned not with theory of parliamentary government, but with the realities—with Parliament at work, its offices, its procedure, the process of legislation, the machinery by which it attempts with indifferent success to control public expenditure, and so forth. That a small error should not slip in now and again amid such masses of detail is inevitable. Thus in comparing the work of the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee Dr. Jennings says of the former: "For the most part it duplicates work done more effectively by the Public Accounts Committee." Dr. Jennings echoes a common opinion. But having served on both Committees I respectfully disagree. The P.A. Committee enjoys the greater prestige and has advantages denied to the Estimates Committee. In particular it can command the services of the Controller and Auditor General and his very competent staff. But the functions are not duplicated. The Public Accounts enquiry is wholly *post mortem*. It may insist on exhumation in order to ascertain the cause of death. But the money has been spent. The Estimates Committee is (technically at least) concerned with current expenditure, though it has, I admit, little power to control it. But at the lowest it educates a score or so of private members in the task of scrutinizing the form of public accounts, and suggests improvements in the form. If the Government and the House would take the Estimates Committee more seriously, and refashion financial procedure in such a way as to give it a real measure of control it might function almost as effectively as the Budget Committee in the French Parliament.

Dr. Jennings is mistaken (p. 89) in assigning to the leader of the House the task of proposing the election of the Speaker. The Speaker is the servant of the House not of the Government. It is properly left, therefore, to private members to propose and second his election. Again—a much smaller error—Mr. Asquith resigned not in 1915 (p. 121) but towards the end of 1916; and to say that he was "ejected" by Mr. Bonar Law is to state as a fact what is still a matter of controversy.

But these are but spots in the Sun. Dr. Jennings has performed a herculean task; he has written a most original book on a hackneyed subject, and a book which may almost be described as indispensable to all who would know how Parliament actually does its work. If every aspirant to parliamentary honours were required to pass a preliminary examination, Dr. Jennings's *Parliament*, as well as his *Cabinet Government*, would certainly be included among the "set books."

J. A. R. Marriott.

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, by H. Hensley Henson. *Cambridge University Press.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

When Bishop Henson was first invited by Lord Stamp to write a book on the Church of England in the *English Institutions Series*, he expressed some hesitation on the ground of his "publicly stated conviction that recent events had rendered the Establishment morally indefensible". But in spite of his initial hesitation the Bishop has written a first-class book upon his subject. It is possible to regard the Church of England as the most typical English Institution, as a microcosm of English ways and opinions. Bishop Henson notes that "moderation in Church and State is the distinctively English note", and illustrates the remark with an apt quotation from Lord Halifax's pamphlet, *The Character of a Trimmer*. "Our climate is a Trimmer . . . our Church is a Trimmer between the frenzy of fanactic visions and the lethargic ignorance of Popish dreams; our laws are Trimmers . . ." On this basis, the fact that Doctor Henson is against the Establishment, and what he describes as Erastian subordination, is no real disadvantage. The reader observes the writer's opposition to Establishment, and that this opposition does not affect the clarity and fairness of the presentation of the facts. Indeed he may even be led to ask whether there may not be in modern conditions some deeper justification for an Establishment, modified in serious respects from the present form, which has escaped Doctor Henson—such a justification, for example, as Mr. T. S. Eliot, has lately published in his *Idea of a Christian Society*.

In any event, the English Institution is excellently portrayed. Chapter after chapter fills one with admiration alike for the firm grasp of history, and the sense of reality, as well as for a noble English style, and the many happy quotations from the Anglican classics! There is no living representative of the Church of England, who writes better, or with more eloquence than Doctor Henson: and that Church is fortunate in having a man of such brilliant gifts, as an expositor and critic, to serve it with his pen. The book ought to be studied; and churchmen generally should be grateful for its publication, not least because it sets forth the historic origins of the Church in and of

England the relations of Church and State, and its position as a *Via Media*, with such directness and vivacity. Those with responsibility in the State, as well as those with responsibility in the Church, will do well to ponder the various criticisms, none of them negligible, with regard to the working of the system, and the imperative need of reform.

There is nevertheless a real lack in the book, which prevents it from being a complete *Speculum Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ*. Doctor Henson is too devoted a disciple of Doctor Butler, author of the *Analogy of Religion*, and a former Bishop of Durham, to be sufficiently alive to either the devoutly evangelical or the catholic strains in the Church of England. The missionary church, and the deeply worshipping church, both elude his appreciation. Archbishop Cranmer is (and well he may be) his hero: and he does full justice to his gifts, including his gift of liturgical expression. Archbishop Laud also wins his homage. But the characteristics of Bishop Lancelot Andrewes, and those who are spiritually akin to him, fail to strike an answering chord. Indeed when Doctor Henson speaks of spiritual independence, he thinks perhaps more of the legal content of that word spiritual, than of the special functions of a spiritual society. There is little in the pages to guide the inquirer as to the meaning of the varied worship which the Church of England offers up in Cathedral and Parish Churches, or that mystical element which is never quite suppressed in any generation of English churchmen. The perfect book about the Church of England has not yet been written. If it could be written, it would contain much of what Doctor Henson describes. But it would have a warmer colour, with some of that enthusiasm, which his illustrious predecessor in the see of Durham deplored, and certainly with something of the quality of that *Ecclesia Anglicana*, which appears in the pages of *John Inglesant*. It would also have something to say of that social reform of which churchmen so different in other ways as Charles Kingsley and Charles Gore were the champions. The Church of England is a church with its roots in the past; and with many anomalies. But these various qualities together may surely help it to speak with new force to the present generation.

THE BISHOP OF CHICHESTER.

LITTLE MADAM: A BIOGRAPHY OF HENRIETTA MARIA, by Janet Mackay. *Bell.* 15*s.*

Drama was indicated when the Catholic daughter of Henri Quatre and Marie de Médicis became Queen of a half-Puritan England. The implication was amply realized in fact. The central period of her life is part of the high theme of the seventeenth century. Her personal fortunes were involved more closely with political events than those of any English Queen Consort, hardly excepting Catherine of Aragon and her immediate successors. Her story belongs moreover to the most controverted period of our history: controverted still, and rightly, since history does not bid us (in the words of Bishop Stubbs) to exclude party feeling or personal sympathy.

Henrietta Maria's name is yet doubtfully familiar to the wider public. It was unhappily Englished from the charming Henriette-Marie at her first

coming as the bride of Charles I; and it has never tripped readily from our tongues. She should rather be thought of as another, and not the least renowned, Queen Mary. That was her official style after the Restoration, and the battle-cry of the ammunition column she led to the King from overseas.

This vivid life, led against a continually stormy background, has received less than chivalrous treatment from contemporaries or historians. Her figure lives rather as the impetuous adviser of the King to his undoing. She was less wronged than wrong. Thus Gardiner: "Her long course of foreign intrigues did more than anything else to bring the King to the block". Her son was loyal and affectionate—he followed Clarendon's counsels against hers. These two rarely achieved more that a surface civility. Thus we miss a notable portrait from Clarendon's great gallery. Cromwell is there; the Queen is missing.

Her judgment was nevertheless an asset to the King at critical moments; it might have been more often but for his stubborn conscience. Her courage served and might have saved him. Both were held in the religious dilemma of the age. He refused equally to yield to his wife's Catholicism and to the popular Puritanism. Yet she could clearly see where Laud was leading him. The Queen loathed the Scottish Prayer-Book little less heartily than Jenny Geddes.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century there was no adequate biography of Henrietta Maria. The publication of her private correspondence by Mrs. Everett Green in 1857 provided the first rich store of material (its discovery something of a romance). This has been supplemented since from her copious correspondence, notably by Baillon and Ferrero, who transcribed the confidences she poured out to her sister Christine, Duchess of Savoy. None of these will call up the emotions of her ill-spelt letters to Charles. "My Dear Heart", she began—and ended "Adieu, My Dear Heart!"

Miss Janet Mackay has rightly preferred to write a personal rather than a political book. She emphasizes the unhappier early years in England, and dates the reconciliation from the death of Buckingham. Her claims to originality in the first of these cannot be admitted without qualification; but the picture of the first disappointment, based on the grumbles of De Tillières, and of subsequent squabbles derived from French sources, is an able piece of work. The best chapter is that which deals with the landing at Bridlington and the renewal of Royalist hopes before Marston Moor. Here the movement is swift; inevitably it halts after the death of the King. It is well to avoid many dates in the text; the use of a chronological table in an appendix is not a complete substitute. A readable "war-time" book; for this gallant life belongs to the continuing story of England.

W. Thomson Hill.

UNSOLVED MYSTERIES OF THE ARCTIC, by Vilhjalmur Stefansson. *Harrap.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

NORTH CAPE, by F. D. Ommanney. *Longmans.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

It was some years ago that, as the sun set over the Arctic Ocean, we were sitting in the little saloon of the research ship "Pourquoi pas?" and

Dr. Charcot turned to me with a twinkle in his eye and said, "I wish someone would have the courage to write a book upon cannibalism on Arctic expeditions". That ship, her owner and her crew have now been claimed by the very sea the secrets of which they did so much to uncover, but had Dr. Charcot been alive to-day I am sure that he would have been among the first to welcome Mr. Stefansson's new book; not only because it fulfils his wish, but also because he would have been among the first to recognize the great amount of practical experience and the scholarship which has gone to the writing of it.

Mr. Stefansson has, long ago, earned for himself a unique place in the history of Arctic exploration and he has examined the five mysteries which he has chosen from the point of view of the knowledge which he has himself acquired and the technique which he has been primarily responsible for evolving during the course of the last thirty years. All the evidence which exists has been carefully co-ordinated and examined and the sources of such information have been listed for the benefit of readers. But this book is no dry-as-dust text book, it has all the elements of the good detective story allied to the unfailing fascination of the North, with the added attraction that the exploits of which it tells are true.

For sheer excitement the story of How Andrée Died is perhaps the best, and that of the Lost Franklin Expedition the least satisfactory, but this is merely because the threads in the latter are so numerous and so diffuse. When it comes to the question of the Disappearance of the Greenland Colony there is one point which has been left untouched and one is tempted to ask, even while agreeing with Mr. Stefansson's theory, how it is that no single trace of the Icelandic language is to be found among the Eskimo to-day?

This book will appeal to everyone, the uninformed reader will find plenty in it to intrigue and to excite, and the reader who has himself experienced the conditions of which it tells will find much valuable information between its covers, while for the scholar there is here a mine of historical fact. If some there are who are tempted to deplore the loss of life in the Arctic, they can find their answer in the words ". . . a more readily measured benefit, is through the knowledge which followed the disappearance of Franklin and Levanevsky"; these men by their deaths were successful in advancing that object which lay so very near to their hearts, the discovery of the secrets of the North.

This point of view will have no appeal for Mr. Ommanney who has no love for the North and no interest in it; he is a Londoner and is interested in his fellow-men. The object of his voyage in a trawler was simply the study of the men who worked aboard her; witness his own words, "The vast grandeur and desolate loneliness of Nature are quite without significance if mankind has not stamped his imprint upon them".

Mr. Ommanney finds Nature so insignificant that he has not even taken the trouble to consult the chart which he tells us was on board; had he done so he would have realized that the North Cape does not happen to be the most northerly point of Iceland, and he would not ask us to believe that the Sergeant could have been shipwrecked

in the particular circumstances which are described in the Faxaflói, in a south-east wind. We should also have been spared his highly original and totally inaccurate description of the ocean currents round the coast of Iceland, in which the Gulf Stream is misplaced by several hundred miles and the Irminger current is ignored, with the result that the drift of tbe sea ice has been transferred from one side of the country to the other.

The lack of the small amount of research which would have prevented these inaccuracies spoils the book, but it will, nevertheless, remain as an outstanding study of the trawlermen, their lives and their characters. There are no attempts to show them other than as they are, no attempts either to glorify or to belittle their achievements, and a thorough understanding and appreciation of their fine qualities and their little weaknesses. It is not only into the characters of the crew that this book gives us an insight, we can also find in it something of the townsman who has gone a-roving. The style shows clearly the reactions of the author, the keen anticipation of adventure, changing through boredom to impatience to be home again, and the gradual swing round to the deep sea fisherman's attitude towards fish preservation.

R. Ansell Wells.

THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL: YESTERDAY, by Ernest A. Baker. *Witherby.* 16*s.*

THE VICTORIAN AGE, by Professor R. B. Mowat. *Harrap.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

With its tenth volume, entitled "Yesterday", Dr. Baker's Brobdingnagian task is finished. We are not, possibly from prudential motives, to expect a "To-day". Dr. Baker's method, speaking generally, is to indicate what his author has made of life, or what life has made of his author, and then to trace the working in his compositions of the experiences undergone.

The four greater lights of "Yesterday" are Conrad, Kipling, Galsworthy and Bennett. The method is especially applicable to the first-named, who only turned to literature in middle age, after choosing the career of seaman. The long years afloat intensified Conrad's native tendency to introspection. Misfortune and exile had been the lot of his family, and this, together with the hardships and tragedies of life at sea, disposed his mind to melancholy. We see the outcome in his novels, whose exotic beauty and strange charm receive ample recognition from Dr. Baker. The salt tang of the sea pervades them, with more of its storm than of its calm. Kipling, Dr. Baker holds, was a heaven-born journalist, who as he developed left journalism far astern. "There has been no finer story-teller in English." Justice is here done to his amazing variety, with some censure of the vulgarity into which some of his enthusiasms occasionally betrayed him.

With the other pair it is plainer sailing. Both were realists, though susceptible to romance. It may be thought that, of the two, Bennett got nearer to reality. Setting out to interpret their age, they succeeded in reflecting in their mirrors restricted sections of it. There is a certain narrowness about their writings. It is possible to weary of the Forsytes, with their perpetual valuation of everything

by what it cost or what it will fetch. As to Arnold Bennett, that most capable entertainer, not even the Five Towns could monopolize his observation and his unflagging curiosity; but he was often superficial.

Over D. H. Lawrence Dr. Baker blows hot and cold. At one moment he says that "the suppression of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* may well be defended"; at another he terms Lawrence a victim of officialdom and the Philistines. Now if any normal person will read *Fantasia of the Unconscious*, which contains Lawrence's interpretation of life, he will probably have no appetite for fiction written round its preposterous and revolting theories. . . . Novel-readers, in particular, should fall with avidity on "Yesterday".

There is much "good, confused feeding" in *The Victorian Age*. The title is somewhat misleading, for only the years from 1840 to 1880 are considered. Of its sixteen chapters, too, three are devoted to French and Italian affairs, and five to features of social history in the United States. The former depict the Second Empire at its zenith and its fall; the latter contain some delightful writing on the correspondence between Carlyle and Emerson, and on the Concord transcendentalists, also an instructive account of the rise and growth of the Republican Party. The other half of the book deals with matters of government, progress and literature among ourselves.

It is doubtless difficult, with so large a canvas, to escape errors. Mrs. Carlyle did not lose her life "in a carriage accident." She died of a heart attack when driving alone in Hyde Park. Remarking on Browning's tendency to go to history for his topics, "even an ecstatic lyric of love", writes the author, "takes unerringly an historical direction—the American Civil War:

"In one year they sent a million fighters forth, South and North."

But does it? If so, Browning had indeed the gift of prophecy, for *Love Among the Ruins* was written and in print six years before that struggle began. This will divert American readers.

H. C. MINCHIN

THE BEST SHORT STORIES OF 1939, edited by Edward J. O'Brien. *Cape*. 7*s*. 6*d*.

TALES FROM THE SAXON SHORE, by S. L. Bensusan. *Routledge*. 10*s*. 6*d*.

MY WIFE ETHEL, by Damon Runyon. *Constable*. 7*s*. 6*d*.

Mr. O'Brien, who annually seeks "the fresh, living current which flows through the best contemporary work" this year has a fairly high register on his ammeter. It derives largely from the American section. Not only is the American short story less of a set art form, more vigorous and alert; one has also the recurrent feeling that whereas most of the English episodes are described, the American are felt. This may be due to some extent to the American abolition of the observer as a useless impediment. The reader is never a third hand recipient of any experience. Like the wedding-guest he is invariably confronted with the Ancient Mariner in person.

The most striking difference between Mr. O'Brien's two sections, however, does not concern technique. It is the paradoxical calm that reigns in the English stories and the unrest that

prevails across the Atlantic. The Escapists who have renounced Europe as 'done' and who would fain follow their lost prophets who have gone to preach the gospel in the Land of Plenty should read such stories as *Bright and Morning Star*, *The Blue Sash*, *Eustacia*, and reflect. With the unrest goes a note of fear. It is a new note in the country of opportunity and experiment. It wars with the old pioneering spirit. In more than one story we can feel wanderlust pinned down by the Depression; the itch to see what is just around the corner overcome by the fear of losing what small stake or job is still left. "A man has no right to have false pride when his family ain't eating," says Albert Maltz in the most terrible of the stories, *The Happiest Man on Earth*. The man is happy because he persuades his brother-in-law to allow him to become a driver of nitro-glycerine lorries, a job in which one in every five men is blown to smithereens. Still, he can earn good money for his impoverished family until the fatal jolt.

And stories such as *Prelude*, in which a gang of hooligans wreck an old Jew's newspaper stand while the crowd look unprotestingly on, and *The Crazy Guy*, which relates how a poor, misguided machine-hater is murdered and branded as a Red, add the question-mark to Mr. Sinclair Lewis's four year old warning *It Can't Happen Here*.

The English section, with stories by Walter de la Mare, H. E. Bates, T. O. Beachcroft, Elizabeth Bowen, Gerald Bullett and Malachi Whitaker, has perhaps more entertainment value. There is a greater range of mood, an absence of ferment, more of what we expect the short story to be. Leslie Halward in *An Impossible Child* recalls Katherine Mansfield, and Geraint Goodwin's *The Lost Land* goes deeper in experience than any other story in the first half of the book.

The two other volumes are variations on individual themes, each played by a virtuoso. Mr. Bensusan extracts from the Essex marshlands and their folk more than any visitor or even 'furrin resident" can hope to glimpse. East Anglia has always seemed to be one of the bleaker, sparser parts of these islands so far as character is concerned. Time and again Mr. Bensusan has stepped in to correct the error. *Tales from the Saxon Shore* is one of the happiest of his collections. His countrymen are people one can laugh at, laugh with and respect.

Damon Runyon has forsaken his molls and gangsters for domestic felicity. Joe Turp writes what I suspect to have been a weekly letter about the small buffets and solaces of his daily life. As the experiences of a good family man should, they all centre around *My Wife Ethel*. Runyon's style remains unchanged; uncanny is his ability to have three people speaking in one sentence with an innumerable sprinkling of 'ses' and yet leave the reader no obstacles to trip over. The episodes are short, the humour is not broad; often the effect is more of an essay than of a tale. Joe, Ethel, Uncle Dan, and their circle are well worth meeting. The effect is as if a youthful Hiram P. Pooter had married Madge Caudle while she was still a flapper and unsoured, and they had lived their garrulous existence in a lower middle-class Brooklyn apartment.

JOSEPH SELL.

MISCELLANEA.

BUT WHO HAS WON? by John Scanlon. *Allen & Unwin.* 6*s.*

Sustained irony is one of the hardest tasks a writer can set himself. It says a good deal for Mr. Scanlon's perseverance that, after *Pillars of Cloud* and *Very Foreign Affairs*, he is still continuing to wield his bludgeon. The victims, as usual, are the politicians, of any and every party, in their elucubrations about trade and peace—with special reference in this new volume to the growing of food at home. The author's own evangel, apparently, is some form of syndicalism. Thus he says in the last page but one :—" When the producers of the world choose a Parliament of producers we will be able to say the People have won ". Like the C.N.T. in Spain his pet aversion is " the political mind " ; and he does not seem to realize that, living as we do in States, it can only be through better and more responsible politics, on the contrary, that democracy can become a reality.

MRS. MINIVER, by Jan Struther. *Chatto and Windus.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

That delightful character, Mrs. Miniver, representative of all that is best in the good women who read *The Times* and of the ideals of their husbands appears now in book form, a little preciously, Mrs. Miniver might think, bound in pink and fancy and enclosed for sale in a dove grey box. Mrs. Miniver is very welcome. She can be read with the Ovaltine or a whisky and soda ; she is never out of place and should always be at hand. Mrs. Miniver has a tranquil mind. She fits like a glove, as the expression is, into every situation and her thoughts are of the pleasantest, when pleasantness is rare.

YOU AND HEREDITY, by Amram Scheinfeld. Edited by J. B. S. Haldane. *Chatto & Windus.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

This is yet another of the " knowledge-made-easy " volumes, which enjoy a justifiable popularity. This particular book sets out to debunk all our pet theories and old wives' tales and it succeeds within a couple of pages in making one realize how hopelessly ignorant man is about man. Illustrations and sketches are good, holding the imagination to the page and when one has finished learning all there is to know about sex, one turns to lighter if still serious subjects, such as the chances of avoiding baldness and the colour of one's children's eyes.

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CORRESPONDENCE

From Mr. Henry W. Nevinson,
President The National Council For Civil Liberties.

To *The Editor*, The Fortnightly Review.

Sir,

HABEAS CORPUS.

The writ of Habeas Corpus has always been regarded as one of the most fundamental safeguards of the liberty of the British subject. Every schoolboy is taught that the Englishman's freedom from arrest or imprisonment without proper trial in a court of law is one of the most important characteristics which differentiate English constitutional democracy from continental despotisms. Judge after Judge through English legal history has laid emphasis on the importance of this writ in preserving the Englishman's independence from the consequences of a mere whim of an arbitrary Executive and it is all the more disturbing, therefore, that Habeas Corpus should have been in fact suspended from time to time during the present century with little opposition and few protests.

The first attempt to suspend Habeas Corpus was in Regulation 14 B of the Defence of the Realm Act in the last war. By that Regulation the Home Secretary took powers to intern anyone who was of hostile origins or associations and whom he considered to be a danger to the realm. The legality of the Regulation was challenged in the courts, and all lovers of liberty should read Lord Shaw's dissenting judgment in the case of Rex v. Halliday. Unfortunately in that case the majority of the House of Lords decided that the Regulation was within the powers conferred by Parliament on the Executive and the consequence has been that since that date the Government has been encouraged to advance further and further in the same field.

After the war the Defence of the Realm Act and the Regulations made thereunder ceased to have effect. As regards Northern Ireland, however, Habeas Corpus was effectually suspended by the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, Northern Ireland, 1922 and 1933. The Government next turned its attention to the colonies. On January 9th, 1936, a special Ordinance was issued in Ashanti to provide for the detention and removal of a certain Chief, and Section 6 of this Ordinance prohibited the right of any court, by a writ of Habeas Corpus, to inquire into the legality of the detention. Subsequently a Deportation Ordinance was introduced in Sierra Leone which also provided that no writ of Habeas Corpus should issue calling in question the legality of any order made under that Ordinance. In August, 1939, the Prevention of Violence Act was passed in England giving the Home Secretary power to detain persons suspected of being implicated in crimes of violence for a period not exceeding five days. This limitation of period was only obtained after the National Council for Civil Liberties had made strong representations on the subject. The attempt—and, to a certain extent, the successful attempt—of the Government to suspend Habeas Corpus in this

particular kind of case was a first taste of the sort of thing we were to expect when war broke out.

The outbreak of war last September naturally resulted in a repetition of many of the Regulations made under the Defence of the Realm Act referred to above. By 18 B of the Regulations made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act the Home Secretary may make an order directing the detention of any person whom he has reasonable cause to believe to be of hostile origins or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm. After the decision in Rex v. Halliday it is quite impossible for us to question the legality of this Regulation, but nevertheless it is necessary to emphasize that it strikes a most serious blow at the fundamental principles of British justice. It is not necessary for the Secretary of State to prove that the person whom he orders to be detained has been guilty of any offence under the criminal law. Indeed, the reason for the use of the Regulation is, of course, the fact that it would be impossible to secure a conviction of the person in a court of law. It is true that there are certain safeguards under the Regulation providing that the internee may make objections against the order to the Advisory Committee and so on, but at the same time the fact cannot be escaped that the personal liberty of British subjects is left to the will and the whim of whoever may be holding the office of Home Secretary. It would be interesting if we could hear the views of the Judges who graced the High Court Bench in the 18th and 19th centuries on the Regulation introduced by His Majesty's Government in 1939.

Although we have been brought up to believe that English democracy is continually developing and " broadening down from precedent to precedent " it is clear that in regard to the liberty of the subject the history of the last twenty years has been a story of reaction. It is essential that the principle that no man in England can be detained without charge and without trial should be re-established if we are once again to be able to pride ourselves on the fact that personal liberty is properly protected by the law of the land.

Yours faithfully,

HENRY W. NEVINSON,

(Hon. D.Litt., LL.D.)

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D. : Born in 1860 Dr. Inge is yet another of the older generation whose energy never seems to flag and whose perception is as keen as ever. We count ourselves fortunate in securing *The End of An Age?* for publication, for in it we can read the considered judgment of a scholar whose reputation has been world-wide for forty years. Popularly—at least in England—he will be best known as Dean of St. Paul's in which position he served from 1911 to 1934, but as lecturer, preacher, and scholar he has long been honoured.

Herbert Rosinski : A former lecturer on Military and Naval strategy to the German Naval Academy at Kiel, 1932-36, Dr. Rosinski has made a deep and continual study of strategy. For the German Naval High Command he translated the works of Admiral Castex. His recent book *The German Army* was very favourably received in the autumn of last year and he is engaged at present in writing a book on the same subject as his article in THE FORTNIGHTLY this month.

W. Friedmann : An international lawyer with a growing reputation in this country, Dr. Friedmann has now been in England for a number of years and is a lecturer in Law at University College, London. He is a frequent contributor on problems of Jurisprudence and International Law to legal journals and readers of THE FORTNIGHTLY may recall his previous article for this journal in October, 1937, "The Challenge of International Law".

Storm Jameson : A well known novelist Miss Margaret Storm Jameson has recently been turning her attention more and more to international politics and the question of world peace. Like so many of her fellow men and women she feels that the immediate cause of war is the inflamed nationalism which divides the States of Europe into hostile bands preventing peace, organization and reconstruction. Her statement will be greatly welcomed.

Richard Church : Poet, novelist and critic, Mr. Church has won fame in all three of these spheres. Readers will be glad to know that a new novel is to be expected from him shortly and that the article which appears in this issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY is the first of a series, to be published every other month throughout 1940, on modern poets.

Robert Machray : No one has a better knowledge of Eastern Europe than Mr. Robert Machray and no one has had a longer experience of his subject. Considerably over eighty Mr. Machray has been a great traveller right up to the time of the present war, and he has written for us many valuable and extremely sound articles over a period of more than forty years.

Notes on our contributors Mr. H. G. Wells, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, General Sir Charles Gwynn, Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, and Mr. Stephen Gwynn appeared in recent issues.